Sunday, September 30, 2012

---- 9/29/12

.

The Times found much to write about.
I did not.  Street demonstrations continue.

http://earlywarn.blogspot.com/2012/09/piigs-unemployment.html

PIIGS Unemployment


The data run through July except for Greece where they only go through June.

Spain and Greece have continued to worsen, while nowhere on the periphery is improving yet.  There are very serious protests in at least Spain, Greece, and Portugal.  The European crisis remains very much unsolved.
Krugman is distracted:

http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/short-political-memories/

Short Political Memories

Busy day, so not much time for posting. Just a note about the oddly short memories of many people commenting on this final stretch of the presidential campaign.
First, there’s the agonizing of Republicans over the choice of Mitt Romney as the party’s paladin. As Jonathan Chait points out, you really have to remember primary season (which shouldn’t be hard, given that it was just the other day, but seems to have vanished into the mists). The fact was that all the non-Mitts were awesomely terrible, indeed ludicrous. The only contender who even looked on paper like a real alternative, Rick Perry, turned out to have three major liabilities: he was inarticulate, he was slow on his feet, and I can’t remember the third (sorry, couldn’t help myself).
Second, people wondering why Paul Ryan hasn’t been able to sell his message; these people have forgotten how the Ryan phenomenon ever happened. Ryan was never able to sell his message to the general public. His constituency was always the Beltway establishment, which had decided that he was the Brave Truth-teller. There was never any good reason to believe that voucherizing Medicare would be anything but desperately unpopular.
Third — and this is prospective — people now invoking the 2004 debates as an example of game-changers (Kerry cut dramatically into a big Bush lead) are, I suspect, failing to remember what happened in that first debate, which was that Bush came across as a total idiot. I suppose this could happen to Obama, but it would certainly be out of character.
So my take is that the GOP was fated to have a weak candidate; that it was predictable that Ryan would be a liability, not an asset; and that anyone imagining that Romney can turn this around on Wednesday is hoping for a very unlikely event."

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Saturday, September 29, 2012

Links 09/29/2012

A River Runs Through…Gale Crater Scientific American
Dioxin Causes Disease and Reproductive Problems Across Generations, Study Finds Science Daily (CL)
Energy wonder crop Arundo raises invasive fears Raleigh News & Observer
Mathematics at Google [PDF]. Interesting!
Faltering Chinese Demand Affecting a Broad Range of Industries Financial Armageddon
China’s Bo Xilai expelled and faces criminal charges BBC
Bo Xilai expelled from CPC, public office Xinhua. Official prose, Chinese style.
Bo Xilai Falls, China’s Microbloggers Gloat WSJ
The Bo Xilai Case: China’s Pandora’s Box New Yorker
A tail-risk short position that will pay off soon John Dizard, FT
Dad, you were right Gillian Tett, FT. A penny for the old guy?
Spanish banks need over 50 billion euros to clean up balance sheets EL Pais (report).
Catalan parliament approves resolution on self-determination El Pais
Portugal at flashpoint as austerity lights fires in mild-mannered populace Guardian
Austerity hurts blood donations  Ekathimerini
French budget raises taxes on rich  Al Jazeera
What the Pope’s butler saw Independent. Power struggles in the Vatican.
Libya thwarts planned anti-militia protests Reuters. No Second Amendment in Libya?
Intelligence officials explain ‘evolving’ US understanding of attack on consulate in Libya AP
Intelligence office says it got Libya attack wrong, not White House McClatchy. Falling on their sword?
Obama blocks Chinese purchase of US wind farms AP. They’re near a drone base.
Fed’s Fisher says U.S. “drowning in unemployment” Reuters
BofA pays $2.4 billion to settle claims over Merrill Reuters
Foreclosure Fraud Settlement Update: Checks to Victims, Servicing Standards, Ongoing Lawsuits David Dayen, FDL
The plan is to pay out the claims in mid-2013. If this works and they get the target of 750,000 responses, then the payout will amount to $2,000 “sorry your home was stolen” checks. However, the challenge will come in actually finding these homeowners, who after all lost their home and experienced an upheaval in their lives. They may have left a forwarding address, and presumably that’s where these claim forms are being sent, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that the families still live there. Moreover, foreclosure victims may be wary of anything through the mail that has their old bank’s name on it and references their past foreclosure. Hopefully the packet doesn’t look like the bank going after them for a deficiency judgment.
Transactional Attorney Ethics Adam Levitin, Credit Slips
The secrets of Buffett’s success Economist
Horatio Alger, RIP National Journal
Does economic growth make you happy? TLS
The politics of central banking Dan Hind, Al Jazeera
Union Man The New Yorker. William Seward.
Want to Build Resilience? Kill the Complexity HBR
Read more at http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/09/links-09292012.html#sLGJhrfK8Hp9bga7.99

Ireland risks becoming 'feeder nation’

Ireland is destined to become a “feeder nation” reliant on money being sent home from workers abroad, a leading hedge fund has warned, dashing hopes of a return to the “Celtic Tiger”.
29 Sep 2012
| 10 Comments

Spain debt rises on aid to banks and regions

Spain's debt level and borrowing needs are set to rise next year, piling pressure on the government to apply for international aid, as it pours funds in to cash-strapped regions and an ailing banking system, its budget showed on Saturday.
29 Sep 2012
| Comment

Green coffee extract will possibly be the snake oil of the twenty first century.

I have a number of printers I have not bothered to use.
Hard copy is mostly for the files.  The cloud is doing well as a file.

You are just going to have to tell me what you want me to know.
You have a concealed carry license from Massachusetts.

Wen Hair Products have drawn several bad reviews. 
I see little that is complimentary. 

I can and will find the studs.  Hanging pictures is not that much of a deal.

AT&T smart phone add addressed to me.  Others may be a better deal.
I would have to study the contract.
The more I learn about the smart phone business the less happy it makes me.

Auto insurance is very competitive.  Talk to an agent. 
I expect there are no real bargains.




.

Saturday, September 29, 2012

@2:09, 9/29/12

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It was a very quiet day for a Friday.

I spent most of it going through the domestic motions and looking for economic developments.
I found none to speak of.
Microsoft has been misbehaving.  I ended up reinstalling windows on an old machine.  It has been doing my mail and taking the hit from AOL.  It is now back at work.
The GOP is looking increasingly like toast.
Foreign disasters before November might save them.



I must get down and sign up for Medicare.

Hair removal is neither an issue or a problem.


In order for new windows to save electricity one must heat or cool electrically.  Leaky double hung windows are thermally horrible.
Most window replacements are aesthetically challenged.
I have dealt with storms and screens.  I can continue.
Heat pumps make good sense if grid power is available.
If it is not we must take other measures.    

I will not need a loan soon.  If you have short term debt we should pay it off.

Life Insurance is for those with debt or dependents.  Having neither I have none. 

Vacuum packing really works.  I am not sure these home kits work.
It is a good way to preserve emergency supplies.

I really just don't care about criminal records.

I really really don't care about criminal records.

I don't want to date random people.

If you won't model I may have to go looking for one.
Probably I will just take pictures of the world.

Medicare requires action.

Get a car that pleases you.  Mine pleases me well enough. 
I do not have to own a Lotus Seven.  It would not carry my boat.

We can go solar. 
This scheme is on the grid. 
Living off the grid is a different problem.

Http://bustygirlcomics.com/
www.girlgeniusonline.com/comic.php
I visit fantasy.  I do not live there.

Hair removal is neither an issue or a problem.

























































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Friday, September 28, 2012

@18:23, 9/28/12

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A very quiet day for a Friday.

Krugman:

"Internal Devaluation and the Road to Wigan Pier

Greg Ip, in correspondence, directs me to Chapter 3 of the latest IMF World Economic Outlook, which among other things contains an analysis of a case that bears directly on the attempts of euro area countries to restore economic health through fiscal austerity and internal devaluation: Britain’s return to the gold standard after World War I.
As the report says, Britain demonstrated a fairly awesome commitment to austerity:
To achieve its objectives the U.K. government implemented a policy mix of severe fiscal austerity and tight monetary policy. The primary surplus was kept near 7 percent of GDP throughout the 1920s.This was accomplished through large expenditure decreases, courtesy of the “Geddes axe,” and a continuation of the higher tax levels introduced during the war. On the monetary front, the Bank of England raised interest rates to 7 percent in 1920 to support the return to the prewar parity, which—coupled with the ensuing deflation—delivered extraordinarily high real rates.
Sad to say, however, the confidence fairy never arrived. Britain suffered prolonged economic stagnation even before the onset of the Great Depression:
And it didn’t even succeed in reducing the debt/GDP ratio, because deflation and slow growth outweighed the effects of austerity.
Not a good omen for Europe."


Conversation starts with a direct communication from you with contact information. Mailing address, a phone number, an email address. 
Any or all would do.

We then arrange a meeting on neutral ground.  A restaurant is often a choice.   I have local duties so I will need to plan ahead.  You have
duties we will need to respect.

Once we know we can enjoy our company we can plan further.

I am anxious to start.  You have the next move.


The Guardian:



More later.
























.

------ 9/27/12

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I am sure things happened today.  Most of them have not made the news.

The ESM was signed by the president of Germany.
The funds are all committed. 
The situation is unchanged.

Krugman:

Not The Election They Were Expecting

A brief, mostly subjective note: This really isn’t looking like the election anyone expected. Obviously it’s not the election Romney and the Republicans expected and wanted; but it’s also looking very different from what Democrats expected.
What Romney & Co. expected was a simple rejection of Obama because of the weak economy. As Greg Sargent often reminds us, this isn’t how it has played at all. On one side, voters tend to react to recent trends, not the absolute level — and the economy has gotten better in some ways over the past year, though obviously not by a lot. On the other, people do remember the crisis of 2008, which they still blame on Bush, and remain willing to cut Obama substantial slack.
But as the polls move strongly in Obama’s direction (yes, I know, it’s all a liberal conspiracy that somehow even includes Fox News), it’s clear at least to me that there’s more going on.
The conventional wisdom — which I too bought into — was that Democrats were going to support Obama, but grudgingly and without much enthusiasm. There had been too many disappointments; the golden aura of 2008 was long gone. Meanwhile, Republicans would show their usual unity and discipline, and at best it would be Obama by a nose.
Instead, the Republicans appear to be in a shambles — while the Democrats seem incredibly united, and increasingly, dare I say it, enthusiastic. (Mark Blumenthal sees this in the polls, but it’s also just the impression you get.)
How did that happen? Partly it’s because this has become such an ideological election — much more so than 2008. The GOP has made it clear that it has a very different vision of what America should be than that of Democrats, and Democrats have rallied around their cause. Among other things, while we weren’t looking, social issues became a source of Democratic strength, not weakness — partly because the country has changed, partly because the Democrats have finally worked up the nerve to stand squarely for things like reproductive rights.
And let me add a speculation: I suspect that in the end Obamacare is turning out to be a big plus, even though it has always had ambivalent polling. The fact is that Obama can point to a big achievement that will survive if he is reelected, perish if he isn’t; health insurance for 50 million or so Americans (30 million from the ACA, another 20 who would lose coverage if Romney/Ryan Medicaid cuts happen) is enough to cure people of the notion that it doesn’t matter who wins.
All of this in turn has an implication that Republicans won’t like — assuming that Rasmussen doesn’t have a special insight into the truth denied to all other pollsters, and that Obama does in fact win with a solid margin. The right is already set up to blame poor Mitt, claiming that he lost because he wasn’t conservative enough. But that’s not what we’re seeing; it looks as if voters are rejecting the right’s whole package, not just the messenger.
As I said, not the election anyone was expecting — but a happy surprise for some, and a nasty shock for others."

And now for a congress that can do what is necessary.

Krugman's op-ed:

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/opinion/krugman-europes-austerity-madness.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss

"So much for complacency. Just a few days ago, the conventional wisdom was that Europe finally had things under control. The European Central Bank, by promising to buy the bonds of troubled governments if necessary, had soothed markets. All that debtor nations had to do, the story went, was agree to more and deeper austerity — the condition for central bank loans — and all would be well. But the purveyors of conventional wisdom forgot that people were involved. Suddenly, Spain and Greece are being racked by strikes and huge demonstrations. The public in these countries is, in effect, saying that it has reached its limit: With unemployment at Great Depression levels and with erstwhile middle-class workers reduced to picking through garbage in search of food, austerity has already gone too far. And this means that there may not be a deal after all.
Much commentary suggests that the citizens of Spain and Greece are just delaying the inevitable, protesting against sacrifices that must, in fact, be made. But the truth is that the protesters are right. More austerity serves no useful purpose; the truly irrational players here are the allegedly serious politicians and officials demanding ever more pain.
Consider Spain’s woes. What is the real economic problem? Basically, Spain is suffering the hangover from a huge housing bubble, which caused both an economic boom and a period of inflation that left Spanish industry uncompetitive with the rest of Europe. When the bubble burst, Spain was left with the difficult problem of regaining competitiveness, a painful process that will take years. Unless Spain leaves the euro — a step nobody wants to take — it is condemned to years of high unemployment.
But this arguably inevitable suffering is being greatly magnified by harsh spending cuts; and these spending cuts are a case of inflicting pain for the sake of inflicting pain.
First of all, Spain didn’t get into trouble because its government was profligate. On the contrary, on the eve of the crisis, Spain actually had a budget surplus and low debt. Large deficits emerged when the economy tanked, taking revenues with it, but, even so, Spain doesn’t appear to have all that high a debt burden.
It’s true that Spain is now having trouble borrowing to finance its deficits. That trouble is, however, mainly because of fears about the nation’s broader difficulties — not least the fear of political turmoil in the face of very high unemployment. And shaving a few points off the budget deficit won’t resolve those fears. In fact, research by the International Monetary Fund suggests that spending cuts in deeply depressed economies may actually reduce investor confidence because they accelerate the pace of economic decline.
In other words, the straight economics of the situation suggests that Spain doesn’t need more austerity. It shouldn’t throw a party, and, in fact, it probably has no alternative (short of euro exit) to a protracted period of hard times. But savage cuts to essential public services, to aid to the needy, and so on actually hurt the country’s prospects for successful adjustment.
Why, then, are there demands for ever more pain?
Part of the explanation is that in Europe, as in America, far too many Very Serious People have been taken in by the cult of austerity, by the belief that budget deficits, not mass unemployment, are the clear and present danger, and that deficit reduction will somehow solve a problem brought on by private sector excess.
Beyond that, a significant part of public opinion in Europe’s core — above all, in Germany — is deeply committed to a false view of the situation. Talk to German officials and they will portray the euro crisis as a morality play, a tale of countries that lived high and now face the inevitable reckoning. Never mind the fact that this isn’t at all what happened — and the equally inconvenient fact that German banks played a large role in inflating Spain’s housing bubble. Sin and its consequences is their story, and they’re sticking to it.
Worse yet, this is also what many German voters believe, largely because it’s what politicians have told them. And fear of a backlash from voters who believe, wrongly, that they’re being put on the hook for the consequences of southern European irresponsibility leaves German politicians unwilling to approve essential emergency lending to Spain and other troubled nations unless the borrowers are punished first.
Of course, that’s not the way these demands are portrayed. But that’s what it really comes down to. And it’s long past time to put an end to this cruel nonsense.
If Germany really wants to save the euro, it should let the European Central Bank do what’s necessary to rescue the debtor nations — and it should do so without demanding more pointless pain."

Krugman did offer the rational for European policy:

Notes On Internal Devaluation (Wonkish)

Still in jet-lag city. Talking to people, and also reading what comes across the threshold, it occurs to me that there’s widespread misunderstanding of what a more or less Keynesian view of Europe’s problems actually implies. People seem to think that it means that (a) internal devaluation can never work (b) any sign of recovery, even a partial rebound, proves Keynes/Krugman wrong (this is a critical part of Baltic boosterism, where the partial recovery of Latvia and Estonia is supposed to be some kind of incredible triumph).
But none of this is right.
Let’s look at a sample of more or less orthodox sticky-price open-economy macro — in this case, Menzie Chinn’s lecture notes (pdf). Menzie actually analyzes the process of internal devaluation, though not by that name, and offers us the following figure and caption:
So over time gradual deflation (or deflation relative to trading partners) increases competitiveness, leading to recovery toward full employment; this implies a period of above-normal growth and, implicitly, above normal growth in exports as well. So if you see these things it isn’t a refutation of the approach, it’s actually what the model predicts.
The point, however, is that it may take a long time — and there’s massive pain along the way.
And to enlarge on a point I made yesterday, what, exactly, is the purpose of imposing harsh fiscal austerity as this process unfolds? I guess it could slightly accelerate the adjustment by driving unemployment even higher; but if the biggest problem is actually one of maintaining social and political cohesion, which seems to be the case, it’s actually counterproductive even for the creditors."

No joy there.

Spain's rising debt costs eat up austerity gains

Spain has pushed through €40bn of fresh austerity measures in the teeth of recession, despite violent protests across the country and separatist crises in Catalonia and the Basque region that threaten to break the country apart.
27 Sep 2012
| 15 Comments



http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/jeremy-warner/9572359/Spain-must-leave-the-euro.html

Yet the eurozone crisis has sparked back into life more swiftly than even I would have anticipated, with the epicentre returning to a fast-shrinking Spanish economy. Political and economic developments are once more threatening to combine into an uncontrollable firestorm.
To understand why, it is first necessary to explode some myths about the nature of the eurozone debt crisis. This is not at root either an isolated banking crisis or indeed a fiscal one, though that’s how public policy in Europe attempts to define it.
As many of us have long argued, both these phenomena are but symptoms of what in essence is just a good old fashioned balance-of-payments crisis. This has been greatly exaggerated by monetary union, which is also preventing the application of time-honoured solutions. Utopian pursuit of the single currency is damning Europe to economic oblivion. Political hubris has eclipsed economic common sense.
After monetary union, capital flowed in ever-increasing quantities from Europe’s surplus to its deficit nations; Germany and others were in essence lending the periphery the money to buy German goods and services. Monetary union precluded the sort of interest and exchange rate discipline that would normally serve to keep things in check.
Cheap money fuelled unsustainable construction and credit booms in the periphery and encouraged governments to spend more than they should. Relative to the core, wages and prices rose, rendering these countries progressively less competitive and deepening the problem of trade imbalances. The deficit countries borrowed to spend, rather than earning it.
Since the onset of the financial crisis, the process has gone violently into reverse. Money has fled the periphery, starving it of credit and exacerbating the economic downturn. Tax revenues have collapsed, causing budget deficits to soar and fiscal crisis to take root.
With a shrinking economy has come a mounting bad debt problem, which Spain and others have yet fully to recognise. Confidence in the banking system is at rock bottom, leaving Spanish banks progressively more dependent on the European Central Bank printing presses to fund their lending.
Spain is looking for some €60bn to recapitalise its banks but this is widely thought a gross underestimate of the true size of the problem. City analysis puts the amount needed to restore credibility at nearer €150bn, or 15pc of GDP. Touchingly, the Spanish government still seems to think that much of this new capital can be raised in markets. In truth, the only two banks thought remotely capable of tapping the capital markets, Santander and BBVA, are also the only two likely to be judged in forthcoming stress tests not to need it. If even British banks are thought “uninvestable”, what hope Spanish banks?
Worries about whether Spain can last the course has caused further capital flight, depriving Spain of the very low borrowing costs normally associated with countries facing rapidly weakening inflation and depression. Much of this money has flowed into Germany, further depressing its own already low cost of borrowing.
A politically explosive polarisation has established itself, whereby some countries face ruinously high borrowing costs, depressing the economy and increasing the challenge of fiscal consolidation, while others have very low costs and therefore a significant competitive advantage.
There are three elements to renewed crisis in Spain. First, Spain as a nation state is manifestly coming apart at the seams under the pressure of rising unemployment and crippling austerity, with Catalonia now openly threatening to secede. Spain’s age-old battle between the forces of regionalism and centralism is back with a vengeance.
Second, an unholy alliance of Northern states – Germany, Holland and Finland – has reneged on promises of direct support from European bail-out funds for the beleaguered Spanish banking industry.
This makes the political and fiscal situation in Madrid even more precarious. Spain had hoped that if banks could be recapitalised directly from the bail-out funds, it might avoid the humiliation of a full-scale sovereign bail-out and acceptance of a reform programme imposed by the EU and the IMF. The original summit agreement also seemed to recognise that the banking crisis was separate from the sovereign fiscal crises, and in some sense the responsibility of Europe as a whole.
In this way Spain might have avoided piling on further sovereign debt to rescue its banks. Spanish banks would be a collective, rather than a sovereign, responsibility.
But it now appears that any money for bailing out Spanish banks must be part of a wider sovereign package with corresponding guarantees and conditions.
This reversal in position by the surplus nations of the North is being taken as an act of extreme bad faith, not just in Spain but in the troubled eurozone periphery as a whole. Trust in European solidarity is being shattered.
Finally, Mariano Rajoy, the Spanish prime minister, has been digging his heels in over requesting any form of bail-out, despite the evident need for one as the Spanish economy slips ever deeper into recession and the budget deficit widens back into double digits. There is now no chance whatsoever of Spain meeting its fiscal targets.
Less than a year after sweeping to power in a landslide victory, Mr Rajoy is already fatally wounded. He promised never to apply taxpayers’ money to bailing out the banks. He already has. He promised not to follow Greece, Ireland and Portugal into a sovereign bail-out. Now, other than leaving the euro, he’s got no choice. Even on gay marriage, Mr Rajoy has failed to deliver as promised.
A further €40bn package of austerity measures has been announced in a desperate bid to get ahead of what Brussels wants of Spain and, we must suppose, thereby obtain a somehow unconditional bail-out, allowing national pride to be salvaged. These measures are almost bound to be self-defeating, for they threaten further to shrink the economy, thereby making deficit reduction tougher still. Spain is chasing its tail into austerity-induced fiscal and economic meltdown. Mr Rajoy is a dead man walking.
Other than leaving monetary union and defaulting on its euro debts, which for the moment even the rebellious Catalans don’t seem to want, is there any way out for Spain? The answer looks ever more likely to be no.
Membership of monetary union is preventing the application of appropriate monetary policy to the periphery sovereigns. The single currency has also denied Europe the natural market mechanism of free floating exchange rates to correct deficiencies in competitiveness and reduce external indebtedness.
There is only one conclusion to be drawn from all this; though the short-term costs would be profound, Spain must leave the single currency.
Spain is damned if it leaves, but damned for eternity if it stays. Eurozone policy as it stands offers no plausible way back to prosperity."




1. COALITION AGREEMENT The three coalition party leaders have reached "basic agreement" on the new austerity package, which will be presented to the troika for approval on Monday, the finance minister has said. Yannis Stournaras was speaking to reporters at 1.20pm as he left the Maximos Mansion, the prime minister's official office, after a meeting with coalition leaders. The measures must be finalised by September 28, when the head of the government's team of financial experts, Panos Tsakloglou, will present the package to a euro working group, finance ministry sources told the semi-official AMNA news agency earlier in the week.
 
2. KOUVELIS’ RESERVETAIONS Democratic Left leader Fotis Kouvelis convened a meeting of his close associates and senior party officials after the meeting of the three coalition government party leaders to brief them on the basic axes agreed by the leaders and to discuss the party's further moves. Sources told AMNA news agency that Kouvelis said he had told the other two leaders that the measures should not be put to vote in parliament before Greece secures commitments from the EU/IMF for the disbursement of the pending tranche of 31.5 billion euro of the bailout loan. The same sources said Kouvelis voiced reservations over an increase of the retirement age from 65 to 67 as to the way and time the measure will be implemented, while on the cuts to holiday bonuses he insisted that they not be abolished but instead that scaled cuts be made.
 
3. FREELANCERS’ TAX The austerity package, which will be implemented from 2013 to 2014, includes drastic changes to the system for taxing freelance professionals, with the introduction of a flatrate of 35 percent on income. This percentage will apply to the total of their net income as it also foresees abolition of the current 5,000 euro tax-free ceiling. The government is considering applying the new rules to 2012 incomes (which taxpayers will declare 2013), so as to bring in an extra 1bn euros in revenue on top of the anticipated 2bn euros.
 
4. DISABILITY PROTEST There were angry scenes at a protest called by disability groups against spending cuts when MAT riot police prevented demonstrators from entering parliament to submit their demands. The demonstration was called in protest at cuts in social benefits and pensions for people with disabilities. Protesters say that they also want the government to protect the tax exemptions they enjoy and for the reopening of schools for people with disability. Over 700 people, including dozens on wheelchairs, attended the protest, which began in Omonoia Square shortly after 11pm and made its way to Syntagma Square, where they intended to enter parliament. Police eventually allowed representatives from the protest to enter the parliament building.
 
5. ANCIENT SERIFOS The 'chora' or main town on the Aegean island of Serifos is to be declared an archaeological site, according to a decision of Greece's Central Archaeological Council (KAS) that was announced on Thursday. The island has a rich history, featuring in ancient myth and legend as the home of the hero Perseus, and has been settled since prehistoric times. Its chora, situated high on a hill overlooking the island's main harbour, is notable for its dramatic views and is classic example of traditional Cycladic architecture. Included in the archaeological site are the town's Medieval settlement, the 'Kastro' or fort, its post-Byzantine churches, a large segment of open land where mosaic floors have been discovered and the Church of the Birth of the Virgin."
 
There will soon be another election in Greece.



We will decide how much insurance I should carry and with whom.
I expect to have insurable risk.

You may buy any car that pleases you.  Another Beetle if you wish.
Cars.com is a place I would look.

Liability I will insist upon.  I am insured that way and plan to stay insured.

Sooner is better.  As soon as you can is best.  <14 br="br" days="days" good.="good." is="is">

I gave up sugar when the times published on it.  I need more activity to harden up.   Building is good.  Bicycle is good.  Walking is better.  I may get to running with the dog(s).
Slowing glucose metabolism is not going to be effective.
There is no safe "royal road" to skinny.  Austerity works for skinny.


















.

Wednesday, September 26, 2012

@9:50, 9/26/12

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Another series of riots in peripheral Europe.
Europe is centered about Denmark?

http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/euro-update-the-perils-of-pointless-pain/

Euro Update: The Perils of Pointless Pain

So, I’m in jet lag city, which means that it’s time for a euro update. (I’ve been pretty focused on the US election, since it is, after all, my country; but still keeping an eye on the other side of the pond).
The basic story of the euro crisis remains the same: it’s essentially a balance of payments crisis, misinterpreted as a fiscal crisis, and the key question is whether internal devaluation is really workable.
What? OK: the roots of the euro crisis lie not in government profligacy but in huge capital flows from the core (mainly Germany) to the periphery during the good years. These capital flows fueled a peripheral boom, and sharply rising wages and prices in the GIPSI countries relative to Germany:
Then the music stopped.
The combination of deeply depressed peripheral economies (which meant surging budget deficits) and fears of a euro crackup turned this into an attack on peripheral-government bonds. But the root remains the balance of payments/cost problem. And any resolution must involve getting costs and prices back in line.
This is the context in which you have to see Mario Draghi’s actions. Twice now — first with the LTRO last fall, then with the plan to buy sovereign debt, he has stepped in to limit runaway bond yields, short-circuiting a possible financial “death spiral” of falling bond prices, collapsing banks, and high-speed capital flight. Here are bond yields (monthly averages, with the most recent data standing in for September):
Good for him. But you still need “internal devaluation”: a sharp fall in costs and prices relative to the core. And that’s a slow, painful process.
Where does austerity fit in to this story? Mostly it doesn’t. Shaving an extra couple of points off the structural deficit will make very little difference to long-run solvency, nor will it do much to accelerate the pace of internal devaluation. It will, however, depress employment even further and inflict a lot of direct suffering too through cuts in social programs.
Why do it, then? Partly it’s because Europe is still operating on the false theory that this is essentially a fiscal issue; partly it’s to assuage the Germans, who remain convinced that those lazy Southern Europeans are getting away with something. In effect, the policy is to inflict pain for the sake of inflicting pain.
Which brings us to the question: can this go on? When do the people of the afflicted economies say that they can bear no more?
The news from Spain, with vast protests and talk of secession, suggests that this moment may be approaching fast. Also, while Greece has long since ceased to be the epicenter, things seem to be breaking down there too.
I really do think Draghi has done very well. But he can’t make internal devaluation work on his own, and he can’t save Europe if its leaders continue to think that gratuitous infliction of pain is sound policy."


The Telegraph:


Jeremy Warner wants the revolution.

The Guardian:


Opiate salesmen.



Autumn of Discontent: Turmoil over Austerity Hits Spain and Greece

Autumn of Discontent Turmoil over Austerity Hits Spain and Greece

SPIEGEL ONLINE - September 26, 2012 The euro crisis seemed to have disappeared from the streets of southern Europe in recent weeks. But on Tuesday in Spain, it was back as thousands marched in Madrid, resulting in dozens of arrests and injuries. In Greece, a general strike has shut down Athens on Wednesday. more...


Times:
Protesters Take to Street in Madrid
section A - page 4
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/09/in-europe-its-debt-vs-jobs.html

Wednesday, September 26, 2012

In Europe, It’s Debt vs. Jobs

By Delusional Economics, who is determined to cleanse the daily flow of vested interests propaganda to produce a balanced counterpoint. Cross posted from MacroBusiness.
Lambert here. Yves comments: “A nice explanation of why austerity in Europe isn’t working (even though the writer is weirdly defensive about saying it in those terms).”
As the signs of social unrest continue to grow in the southern peripheries of Europe, highlighted again by the over night action in Spain, I thought it was timely to take a step back from the day-to-day and re-assess exactly what we are witnessing in the Eurozone from the longer macro-view.
If you’ve been reading my near-daily pontifications about Europe for any length of time you should be aware that I consider the policy approach being taken in the Eurozone to be the makings of a real disaster. I have been accused by some of being anti-austerity but that isn’t my real issue with the policy at all. My major concerns has been that policy targets of internal devaluation and export driven recovery in the absence of debt forgiveness on a near-contintent wide scale will fail because:
a ) the initial outcome will be a rapid decline in industrial production and national incomes which mean existing debts will become unserviceable
b ) external surpluses require a counter-party external deficit
c ) structural adjustments require investment
So basically, the three targeted outcomes for the existing policy a) service existing debts, b) lower government deficits c) become export competitive are incompatible because the expectation that falling internal demand will quickly be replaced export driven production is a form of utopian economic fantasy.
Over the last two years Greece has been held up as a ‘outlier’ for what should occur but the reality is, as Spain and Portugal are now demonstrating, that this outcome is the most likely and,  as I have been discussing , completely predictable.
As I mentioned a few weeks ago, Portugal, the poster child of austerity, is failing to meet its targets even though it appeared to be on target over the previous 18 months. What we see in Portugal is a country bouncing off the limits of the current policy.
The basic premise of European policy is to tighten government budgets in an effort to drive down deficits. In the absence of a current account surplus in order to maintain a level of national income  this requires an expansion of private sector balance sheets. If this does not occur then the most likely outcome is a slowing of internal demand and therefore a slowing of imports. This in turn should drive the balance of trade towards positive territory, but at the same time lower overall GDP.
Falling GDP leads to falling national income, which in the absence of real across the board wage deflation means more unemployment and therefore slowing government revenues which, as I’ve said previously, leads to a self-defeating process of re-newed cuts to government budgets.
So in essence this whole process becomes a struggle between the balance of the external sector, real wages  and unemployment and this is the dynamic we have been witnessing in much of the periphery over the last 18 months. What I have noticed recently is that the adjustments in periphery nations balance of trade has been seen by some as a sign of recovery, which in part it is, but ultimately what is required is a sustained current account surplus.
The counter-weight to these external sector adjustments is on-going social retrenchment that occurs as unemployment rises. This is why the existing debt  and lack of currency devaluation are such barriers because without them it is likely to be impossible for struggling nations to reach a current account surplus, especially as they are all trying to enact the same policies all at once.
In short, much of the economic framework that allowed the periphery to get into this situation in the first place is now making it far more difficult for them to get out and it would now appear we are reaching the limits of the social and political systems within these nations to deal with the stresses. Obviously it’s not to much of a stretch to realise this situation could escalate quickly, and I have warned previously that political capital was likely to be tested over the next 12 months as the continuing deterioration in the Eurozone economy frays the remaining goodwill. I see the back-track from the Portuguese government and the growing tension in both Madrid and Catalonia as recent examples of just this.
Below are some corresponding charts of the metrics I have discussed above.
Portugal





Spain





Greece




Read more at http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/09/in-europe-its-debt-vs-jobs.html#CeTvq5LYhldoiRI0.99
Obama is up by 4.9% at TPM.

. . .

I hope it is that you are back and not that I have been discovered by the spammers.

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Or will be in ten days?

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I could retire but would rather hang in and max my benefit.

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