Mark Thoma on Jeff Sachs. Also
Ryan Cooper. And
here’s what happens
if you actually read the links from Scarborough-Sachs: you find that
what I actually said bears no resemblance to their, ahem, crude
caricature of my views.
The truth is that I came into this crisis
with what I think can be described as a pretty sophisticated view of
liquidity-trap economics, based on my own work on Japan in the late
1990s and that of Mike Woodford and Gauti Eggertsson. This view made
some predictions — about interest rates, about the effect of large
increases in the monetary base, and about the size of fiscal multipliers
— that were very much at odds with what a lot of people were saying;
those predictions have been overwhelmingly confirmed by recent
experience.
I guess I can understand some people not wanting to
believe that evidence. But they don’t help their case by pretending that
there is no evidence, and certainly not by pretending that people like
me, Brad DeLong, Martin Wolf, Larry Summers etc. etc. are ignoramuses
who unconditionally favor fiscal expansion under all conditions, as
opposed to as a specific remedy under special conditions that happen to
apply right now."
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2013/03/crude-sachsism.html
"
Crude Sachsism
Jeff Sachs:
Professor Krugman and Crude Keynesianism, by Jeff Sachs: I recently
published a Washington Post op-ed called
"Deficits do Matter" that was co-authored with talk-show host, commentator
and former Congressman Joe Scarborough. The piece argues that high and rising
levels of public debt are a real concern. It also makes the case that the
stimulus packages that began in 2009 --which have consisted mainly of temporary
tax cuts and transfer payments -- have significantly raised the public debt
while doing very little to solve the nation's long-term employment and growth
problems.
Let's stop there. As many people have
pointed out, the basic premise that Krugman thinks deficits don't matter is
just wrong (see some of his earlier writing when we weren't in a liquidity trap
as well, he is very clear on this point). Here's Krugman:
Right now, deficits don’t matter — a point borne out by all the evidence. But
there’s a school of thought — the modern monetary theory people — who say that
deficits never matter, as long as you have your own currency. I wish I could
agree with that view — and it’s not a fight I especially want, since the clear
and present policy danger is from the deficit peacocks of the right. But for the
record, it’s just not right.
Back to Sachs:
... I have argued against short-term stimulus packages. Krugman has supported
them, and indeed argued that they should have been even larger. I have been
against temporary tax cuts and temporary spending programs, believing that
instead we need a consistent, planned, decade-long boost in public investments
in people, technology, and infrastructure. Such a sustained rise in public
investment should have been paid for by ending the Bush-era tax cuts in 2010, or
by adopting a comparable boost in revenues. Instead Obama and Congress have now
made almost all of those tax cuts permanent, putting us into a deeper fiscal
bind.
On Twitter, he goes a bit further:
@madarts13 @ktguru @joenbc @kdrum I don't.I think short-run stimulus has little effect on GDP. I want long-term growth strategy instead.
— Jeffrey D. Sachs (@JeffDSachs) March 9, 2013
He can think whatever he wants, but the evidence says otherwise. In a severe
recession government spending multipliers are much larger than in normal times.
That's why this statement is so puzzling:
...First off, here is what I mean when I say that Krugman is a crude
Keynesian...
There are four elements of crude Keynesianism and, indeed, of Krugman's
position:
(1) The belief that multipliers on tax cuts and transfers are stable,
predictable and large; (2) The belief that America's employment and growth
problems are overwhelmingly cyclical, not structural, and therefore remediable
by short-term aggregate demand management; (3) The belief that a growing debt
burden is a minor nuisance as long as the economy is in recession; (4) The
belief that for practical purposes, the most urgent need is to raise aggregate
demand rather than to focus on the quality and type of public spending.
I believe that all of these positions are misguided.
Again, he can believe whatever he wants, but the evidence is against him. On
(1), as already noted, Krugman has NOT said that multipliers are "stable,
predictable, and large." He is saying what both the theorists and empiricists
looking at this are saying, that multipliers are larger in a liquidity trap.
It's a result that comes directly out of modern DSGE models. Second, asserting
that our problems are mostly cyclical is fine, but go to the SF Fed who has done
a lot of work on this, talk to Narayana Kocherlakota at the Minnesota Fed sho
was persuaded to change his mind on this -- go to paper after paper and they all
say the same thing, there is a very large cyclical component to our problem. I
know he wants to use this argument to push his favorite green policies, etc.,
but it needs to be grounded in theory and the empirical evidence. On (3),
where's the evidence that financial markets are worried? It's not there. And (4)
-- the charge that Keynesians/Krugman don't worry about the quality of spending
-- is again wrong.
More specifics from Sachs on these arguments:
First, Krugman believes that fiscal multipliers are predictable and large. Thus,
a $1 rise in government spending of any kind, according to Krugman, predictably
leads to something like $1.50 in higher GDP. Similarly, a $1 cut in payroll
taxes leads to something like a $1.30 rise in GDP.
Don't miss the work "might":
The belief in stable, predictable, and large multipliers is belied by both
theory and evidence. Households and local governments might simply use a
temporary tax cut or temporary transfer, for example, to pay down debts rather
than to increase spending, especially because the tax cut or transfer is seen to
be temporary. Businesses, concerned about the buildup of public debt, might hold
back on business investment in the face of large deficits, anticipating higher
taxes in the future.
The original stimulus legislation was overwhelmingly of the form of temporary
tax cuts and temporary transfer payments, the kind of deficit spending
especially likely to have little effect on aggregate demand. Only $88 billion of
the $787 billion stimulus-package was in direct purchases of goods and services
by the federal government. The rest was temporary transfers and tax cuts.
(This was not an accident. A critical and predictable weakness of the 2009
stimulus is that House Democrats and the White House negotiated it in just a few
weeks. In the unnecessary haste, there was no serious consideration given to
long-term needs in infrastructure, for example. With presidential leadership we
could -- and should -- have forged a decade-long strategy. ...
He got what he could from Republicans, and it had to include tax cuts (nearly
40 percent). I wasn't happy either, but it is a lot more complicated than just
simply asserting "poor leadership." But the weird thing is the assertion about
no infrastructure spending. Let me turn it over to Ryan Cooper:
Jeff Sachs ... [has] one of the most bizarre pieces of economic analysis I’ve
seen, arguing among other things that 1) the stimulus was too focused on
short-term stuff like tax cuts which 2) aren’t effective stimulus anyway (huh?)
and 3) should have had much more long-term investment. Listen to him complain...
Nutty aggregate demand issues aside, this is simply ignoring the plain facts.
The stimulus did have money for renewable energy ($90 billion in fact),
upgrading our rail network, and highway maintenance. A book has been written
about this
very topic, large sections of which is devoted to lamenting the fact that
lazy, irresponsible pundits and reporters then and now keep complaining that the
stimulus didn’t have things it in fact had.
Peggy Noonan got hammered for
complaining Obama hadn’t done infrastructure spending he had in fact done, but
no one was surprised because it’s Peggy Noonan and she’s basically your crazy
aunt. But Jeff Sachs is supposed to be a professional economist. ... I would
have thought he could at least bother to read a summary of such a huge bill
before holding forth. ...
Back to Sachs:
... Krugman argues that the stimulus worked just as advertised, with the multipliers
that were predicted, but that other factors held up recovery. ... My own view is that the predicted multipliers were too
high in the first place, especially for such a poorly designed tax-and-transfer
program, and that recovery is impeded by structural factors. These structural
components are not susceptible to a Keynesian diagnosis or to a Keynesian
remedy. They require a long-term public investment response that has not been
forthcoming.
Again, he talks about my view rather than the actual evidence on these
points. Sure, you can find estimates of multipliers that support his position,
but the majority of the evidence is on Krugman's side. Also, Krugman said the
package wasn't large enough (and could have been constructed better), so there's
no real disagreement on that point, this is just another way for Sachs to claim
multipliers are small contrary to much of the evidence.
Second, Krugman seriously and repeatedly downplays these structural changes
occurring in the U.S. economy. He repeatedly emphasizes that we suffer a demand
shortfall, pure and simple, one easily remedied by more stimulus. Yet it's
increasingly hard to reconcile many features of the U.S. economy with this view.
...
What are some of the structural problems? These include large-scale offshoring
of jobs, large-scale automation of jobs, decline in demand for low-skilled
workers, skill mismatches, broken infrastructure, and rising global energy and
food prices. These require various kinds of targeted public investment spending,
not simply aggregate demand.
This is silly, most of those factors were already present prior to the
recession. The recession added a large cyclical component on top of whatever
pre-existing structural issues were in place.
To summarize so far, despite considerable evidence to the contrary, Sachs
position is that short-run multipliers are small, and even if they aren't
there's little cyclical unemployment. So we need to do the things I was pushing
prior to the recession instead.
Anyway, trudging on:
In view of these challenges, would a different kind of spending program have
worked better? If the spending had been concentrated on long-term infrastructure
and job skills, with investments carried out not for two years but over the
course of a full decade (as in the 1950s-60s national highway program), the
answer is probably yes. But such projects were not "shovel ready."
Such long-term investment programs are very different from quick-and-dirty
Keynesian "stimulus" packages such as temporary tax cuts. Long-term investment
programs require thinking and planning of the kind that has never happened with
Obama's stimulus packages. ...
The Administration should indeed have taken several months in 2009 to design and
advocate for long-term investment programs for renewable energy, fast intercity
rail, large-scale highway upgrading, large-scale skill and job training, and so
forth, rather than rushing to pass a stimulus package of hundreds of billions of
dollars of shortsighted and largely ineffective temporary tax cuts and transfer
programs. The budget should have paid for such new long-term investments by
allowing the temporary Bush-era tax cuts to expire on schedule in 2010 (or by
negotiating equivalent revenues of 2-3 percent of GDP per year as the price for
maintaining the Bush-era tax cuts).
Again, this is mainly a disagreement about short-run multipliers. Take your
time, no need to hurry (other than the millions of people who are unemployed and
struggling to make ends meet). Krugman and others (like me) say that yes, of
course, shovel-ready infrastructure is the first choice, and of course we need
to make progress on our long-run issues. But while we are getting that done, why
the hell wouldn't we want to do whatever it takes to alleviate the suffering in
the shorter-run?
Back to Sachs:
One of the Obama arguments at the time was that the rush in the stimulus program
was needed to avoid a Great Depression. This was and is highly doubtful (though,
yes, it is widely accepted). The US economic emergency in late 2008 and early
2009 wasn't really an aggregate demand crisis but a financial crisis. The
chaotic failure of Lehman Brothers had led to an intense panic and credit
squeeze. The Fed therefore needed to flood the markets with liquidity, which it
rightly did, in order to unwind the panic. The Fed's action was the real
difference with 1933 (when the Fed allowed the banks to fail). It was the Fed,
not the fiscal stimulus, which prevented a fall into depression.
But, again, so what if it wasn't the key to avoiding another "Great
Depression" (though he seriously underplays the role of automatic stabilizers in
helping along these lines), if we can end suffering -- help the unemployed -- we
should do so.
Now the deficit hawkery:
Third, crude Keynesians like Krugman believe that we don't have to worry about
the rising public debt for many years to come, perhaps well into the next
decade. This is remarkably shortsighted. The public debt has already soared,
from around 41 percent of GDP when Obama came into office to around 76 percent
of GDP today (and with no lasting benefit to show for it). If Krugman had his
way, and deficits were not restrained, the debt-GDP ratio would already be above
80 percent by now and would be rising rapidly towards 90 percent and above (as
shown in the recent CBO alternative scenario).
No lasting benefit? Is he serious? The automatic stabilizers alone had a huge
benefit, and the discretionary policy helped as well (despite his insistence in
every possible way that short-run multipliers are near zero).
Not sure I can go on, but here's more (reacting to my first read, and
don't plan to proof what I've written as usual for typos, etc. as I
don't feel like reading this again):
...
It's true that we've not paid heavily so far for this rising debt burden because
interest rates are historically low. Yet interest rates are likely to return to
normal levels later this decade, and if and when that happens, debt service
would then rise steeply, increasing by around 2 percent of GDP compared with
2012. Many people seem to believe that we can worry about rising interest rates
when that happens, not now, but that is unsound advice. The build-up of debt
will leave the budget and the economy highly vulnerable to the rise in interest
rates when it occurs. The debt will be in place, and it will be too late to do
much about it then.
Yes, because of problems that might happen "later this decade" we should let
people suffer now (and besides, it's all structural and multipliers are zero).
Let's move to his fourth point:
Fourth, crude Keynesians believe that for all intents and purposes, "spending is
spending." ...
No he doesn't. Not at all. Again, this is just an argument that short-run
multipliers are zero, blah, blah, blah. Krugman has made it clear that quality
of spending matters, but if we can't get infrastructure spending in place in
time we should help people in other ways. Sorry if that interferes with Sach's
pet issues.
Moving along:
This approach is disastrous both politically and economically. Progressives like
myself believe strongly in the potential role of public investments to address
society's needs... Spending is not spending. The U.S. needs productive
public investments, not wasteful spending. ...
Yes. it's very wasteful to help the unemployed through non-infrastructure
spending. Wonder how he feels about food stamps? Are those okay?
Let's go to Sachs' conclusion:
... Mr. Krugman, I believe
that you are a crude Keynesian at a time when we need subtler, surer,
longer-term policies.
That subtler set of policies should include:
(1) Decade-long public investment programs in renewable energy, upgraded public
infrastructure, fast rail, job training and the like; (2) Adequate fiscal
revenues (including tolls on infrastructure) to pay for these investments over
the course of a decade, including a downward path of the debt-GDP ratio; (3)
Increased revenues through taxation on high net worth, financial transactions,
high incomes, capital gains and carried interest, offshore corporate earnings,
and carbon emissions, and a stiff crackdown on tax havens and phony transfer
pricing.
All of this would have been much easier if Obama had started down this long-term
path in 2009, and had never conceded the permanence of the Bush-era tax cuts for
almost all households. Instead, he followed a populist and shortsighted policy
of "stimulus" and tax cuts. ...
We all agree on the need to address the long-run issues, and I have called for
infrastructure spending again, and again, and again as a way to help the economy
is both the short and longer runs. But that doesn't mean we should ignore other
policies -- money spent on things other than infrastructure -- that might help
people in the short-run. Short-run multipliers are sufficiently large, there is
substantial cyclical unemployment, and out debt problems are not immediate. I
hope Jeff Sachs does manage to get his favorite projects in place -- I support
them -- but not at the expense of people who have already spend far too long
struggling to get by as they look for work"
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/opinion/krugman-dwindling-deficit-disorder.html?hp
"For three years and more, policy debate in Washington has been dominated
by warnings about the dangers of budget deficits. A few lonely
economists have tried from the beginning to point out that this fixation
is all wrong, that deficit spending is actually appropriate in a
depressed economy. But even though the deficit scolds have been wrong
about everything so far — where are the soaring interest rates we were
promised? — protests that we are having the wrong conversation have
consistently fallen on deaf ears. What’s really remarkable at this point, however, is the persistence of
the deficit fixation in the face of rapidly changing facts. People still
talk as if the deficit were exploding, as if the United States budget
were on an unsustainable path; in fact, the deficit is falling more
rapidly than it has for generations, it is already down to sustainable
levels, and it is too small given the state of the economy.
Start with the raw numbers. America’s budget deficit soared after the
2008 financial crisis and the recession that went with it, as revenue
plunged and spending on unemployment benefits and other safety-net
programs rose. And this rise in the deficit was a good thing! Federal
spending helped sustain the economy at a time when the private sector
was in panicked retreat; arguably, the stabilizing role of a large
government was the main reason the Great Recession didn’t turn into a
full replay of the Great Depression.
But after peaking in 2009 at $1.4 trillion, the deficit began coming down. The
Congressional Budget Office expects
the deficit for fiscal 2013 (which began in October and is almost half
over) to be $845 billion. That may still sound like a big number, but
given the state of the economy it really isn’t.
Bear in mind that the budget doesn’t have to be balanced to put us on a
fiscally sustainable path; all we need is a deficit small enough that
debt grows more slowly than the economy. To take the classic example,
America never did pay off the debt from World War II — in fact,
our debt doubled in the 30 years that followed the war. But debt
as a percentage of G.D.P. fell by three-quarters over the same period.
Right now, a sustainable deficit would be around
$460 billion.
The actual deficit is bigger than that. But according to new estimates
by the budget office, half of our current deficit reflects the effects
of a still-depressed economy. The “cyclically adjusted” deficit — what
the deficit would be if we were near full employment — is only about
$423 billion, which puts it in the sustainable range; next year the
budget office expects that number to fall to just $172 billion. And
that’s why budget office projections show the nation’s debt position
more or less stable over the next decade.
So we do not, repeat do not, face any kind of deficit crisis either now or for years to come.
There are, of course, longer-term fiscal issues: rising health costs and
an aging population will put the budget under growing pressure over the
course of the 2020s. But I have yet to see any coherent explanation of
why these longer-run concerns should determine budget policy right now.
And as I said, given the needs of the economy, the deficit is currently
too small.
Put it this way: Smart fiscal policy involves having the government
spend when the private sector won’t, supporting the economy when it is
weak and reducing debt only when it is strong. Yet the cyclically
adjusted deficit as a share of G.D.P. is currently about what it was in
2006, at the height of the housing boom — and it is headed down.
Yes, we’ll want to reduce deficits once the economy recovers, and there
are gratifying signs that a solid recovery is finally under way. But
unemployment, especially long-term unemployment, is still unacceptably
high. “The boom, not the slump, is the time for austerity,”
John Maynard Keynes declared many years ago. He was right — all you have to do is
look at Europe to see the disastrous effects of austerity on weak economies. And this is still nothing like a boom.
Now, I’m aware that the facts about our dwindling deficit are unwelcome
in many quarters. Fiscal fearmongering is a major industry inside the
Beltway, especially among those looking for excuses to do what they
really want, namely dismantle Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security.
People whose careers are heavily invested in the deficit-scold industry
don’t want to let evidence undermine their scare tactics; as the deficit
dwindles, we’re sure to encounter a blizzard of bogus numbers
purporting to show that we’re still in some kind of fiscal crisis.
But we aren’t. The deficit is indeed dwindling, and the case for making
the deficit a central policy concern, which was never very strong given
low borrowing costs and high unemployment, has now completely vanished."
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