A remarkably important and persuasive paper that calls into
question the need for “reforming” Medicare has not gotten the attention
it warrants. “
An Examination of Health-Spending Growth In The United States: Past Trends And Future Prospects”
(hat tip nathan) by Glenn Follette and Louise Sheiner looks at the
model used by the Congressional Budgetary Office to estimate long term
health care cost increases. Bear in mind that this model is THE driver
of virtually all forecasts of future budget deficits.
This paper, although written in typically anodyne economese, is
devastating in the range and nature of its criticisms. And the reason
this assessment should be taken seriously, independent of the importance
of the issues it raises, is that the authors are uniquely qualified to
make this critique. Follette is
chief of the Fed’s fiscal analysis section. Sheiner,
a fellow member of that group,
has worked for both the Treasury and the Council of Economic Advisers
previously. In other words, the sort of analysis they have made here is
the core of what they do on a daily basis.
The argument made by the opponents of the plans to cut Social
Security and Medicare generally take this form: concerns about Social
Security are greatly exaggerated. They are based on long-term forecasts,
which are notoriously inaccurate in outlying years. The most commonly
cited, by the Trustees of the Social Security system, projects the
exahustion of the famous trust fund in 2033.
As several analysts have observed, if Social Security really has a problem, we’ll know it in plenty of time; there’s no need to do anything immediately.
By contrast, conventional wisdom is that Medicare does have a long
term cost predicament, but the problem is not demographic, but that of
the steep rise of health care costs in general.
The fundamental beef of Follette and Sheiner with the CBO model is
that it naively assumes past growth in health care spending as the basis
for its long-term projections. The result is that it shows that trees
will grow to the sky. One of the things anyone who has build forecasting
models will tell you is you come up with assumptions that look
reasonable and then sanity check the output (for instance, does your
model say in year 10 that your revenues will be 3x what you can produce
given your forecast level in plant and investment? If so, you need to
make some revisions). The Fed economists point out numerous ways that
the model output flies in the face of what amounts to common sense in
the world of long term budget forecasting. From the opening of the paper
(emphasis ours):
Long-run projections of the U.S. federal budget have
played a prominent role in discussions about fiscal policy and the
design of major transfer programs for several decades. The projections
typically show large fiscal imbalances owing to ramping up of retirement
and health care costs relative to GDP. Health care costs are the key factor in these projections
for two reasons. First, in current projections they are the prime
source of growth of spending as a share of GDP. Second, they are the
most uncertain part of the forecast. For example, the Congressional
Budget Office’s most recent long run outlook shows spending on Medicare
and Medicaid, the governments health programs for the old and poor,
respectively, rising from 4.1 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 19.1 per cent
of GDP in 2082.1 By contrast, Social Security benefits (the government’s
main old-age pension program) increase only 2 percentage points, from
4.3 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 6.4 per cent in 2082. Another analysis by
CBO suggests that an 80 per cent confidence band around the Social
Security projection would be from 51⁄2 to 91⁄2 per cent of GDP.2 CBO did
not present similar calculations for health spending; instead, they
projected health spending under three different assumptions about the
rate of growth of age-adjusted health care spending in excess of per
capita income. Their projections show health spending ranging from 7 to nearly 40 per cent of GDP by 2082.
By comparison, defense spending as a percent of GDP
peaked at 42% of GDP
in World War II. A model that presents as a possible outcome that the
US will devote nearly 40% of GDP to health care spending a long-term,
sustained outcome, is ludicrous on its face. The CBO assuming public
health care spending will sustain its growth rate of the last 50 years
for as long as they do (see further discussion below) with no policy
changes is like budget analysts in 1946 assuming that military spending
will grow at the same rate it did during World War II without any policy
changes. Yet they further assume that, having reached this crushing
level, Medicare costs in 2082 will still be growing faster than GDP!
The underlying issue is that nothing that is a large portion of GDP
can exceed the growth rate of GDP forever, or even for all that long;
that’s how we’ve gotten in the insane position of having health care
reach 16% of GDP. The term of art is “excess health care spending
growth” which as noted above, they define in relationship to per capita
incomes. The Fed economists make the following observations in their
paper:
1. Given the concern about health care cost escalation, and the
pressure being exerted now by employers to contain these costs, as well
as the fact that other advanced economies have shown declines in excess
costs, the growth assumptions look very aggressive. Moreover, the excess
growth took place during a period when government and private health
care insurance expanded greatly. In 1960, out-of-pocket spending was 52%
of medical spending; by 2006, it had fallen to only 13% by 2006.
Follette and Shiener also looked at the composition of cost drivers and argued that certain key ones will moderate:
Accordingly, 1.1 percentage points of the [historical]
2.2 percentage points of age-adjusted excess growth over the period
resulted from technological change and other factors and 1.1 percentage
points reflected the effects increased insurance coverage and
administrative costs.16 The historical data therefore support excess
growth of 1.1 per cent per year if we assume that out-of-pocket costs do
not decline further and that administrative costs (as a share of
expenditures) do not rise further. However, demand should fall short of
this as consumers respond to rising health bills.
The Fed economists separately find that excess growth has averaged 2%
over the last 40 years but has been slowing and argue that 1% excess
growth is a likely upper bound for the long term average. They posit
that excess growth of 2% can be maintained for only a few years at most
because consumption as a percentage of GDP is anticipated to fall (this
is in the CBO’s own models; it’s mainly the result of the trade deficit
falling). By contrast, the CBO assumes 2.4% excess growth for Medicare
and 2.2% for Medicaid over the next decade, falling monotonically to
1.1% for Medicare and 0% for Medicare by 2082. If you’ve ever run
financial models, you’ll know that goosing the growth rates in the early
years has an impressive impact on the final result.
2. The CBO model produces the peculiar result that government funded
plans will show faster cost growth than private plans. From the article:
Our chief concern with their projection is their
assumption that per capita spending by Medicare grows much more rapidly
than that of the private sector. The projected divergence seems
inconsistent with the underlying assumption that policies are unchanged
because Medicare and private sector insurance plans have had similar
payment rates historically.
3. The Fed budget experts note that the CBO analysis violates the
requirements for CBO budget projections. The CBO is tasked to forecast
assuming no policy changes. But in simply relying on historical trends,
which as noted above include considerable expansion of government-funded
health coverage, they have effectively incorporated the hidden
assumption of continued expansion. Put it another way, the forecasts
should have explicitly backed out the impact of historical increases in
health insurance coverage to arrive at a true baseline growth rate. Per
Follette and Sheiner:
The lack of distinction between policy and other factors
is a particular problem because CBO uses different excess cost growth
assumptions for Medicare, Medicaid, and other health spending, and the
CBO projection is supposed to be under the assumption of no policy
changes. Past Medicare spending growth includes factors that are not
assumed to continue in the future. For example, the Medicare Part B
premium was not previously indexed to Medicare spending; thus Medicare
spending growth grew faster than overall health spending, as Medicare
picked up a higher share of spending. Similarly, Medicare policies
changed to include renal dialysis, HMOs, coverage of the SSI population,
and more broadened coverage of home health care. As CBO is not assuming
further expansion of Medicare, it does not seem reasonable to forecast
future growth based on historical growth rates that include such
expansions. Similar issues arise with Medicaid.
4. Follette and Sheiner find that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
that more realistic health care cost assumptions allow for some
improvements in coverage to low income groups, provided government
coverage to the better off is not increased further:
We find that a narrow expansion of assistance to the
lowest quintile would have only minor consequences to government
finances but more broad-based programs would have materially deleterious
effects.
* * *
The CBO’s performance on this front looks like malpractice. The Fed
economists note telling irregularities, such as the substitution of
scenarios, as opposed to the use of confidence band analysis, as the CBO
employed in its Social Security forecasts. And this would not the first
time that CBO has apparently allowed political considerations to
interfere with its pretense of objectivity. First we have the case of
CBO analyst Lan Pham, who was fired for attempting to incorporate the
impact of foreclosures and chain of title issues on home price and
property tax forecasts. Second, we have the instance of Tom Ferguson and
Rob Johnson of alerting the CBO to a significant omission in their
deficit analysis, that of failing to include financial assets in their
debt-to-GDP ratio calculation. CBO staffers have not disputed the
accuracy of the
Ferguson/Johnson research
but nevertheless will not change their projections. Now we have what is
demonstrably an overly aggressive set of assumptions driving health
policy debate, with two Federal Reserve analysts sufficiently taken
aback by the model as to publish a serious takedown of it.
The CBO’s independence is, like its output, treated as above question. It’s time to subject both to harsh scrutiny.
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