Thursday, June 28, 2012

@22:52, 6/27/12

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The summit will fail.

Then what?   Europe does not close. 
Greece will shortly begin issuing a new currency.  They have no choice.
Greek bonds will become very cheap.  Dealings with the Greek governments  will have to be in the new currency.  This will support the exchange rate for a time.  The Europe wide operations will close for lack of customers.  The price of motor fuel will spike up.  Car dealers will go broke if they have not.  The ECB will take a big hit. 
There are probably not many Greek Sovereign bonds in private hands.
The bond interest rates of debtor nations will spike up. 
Credit default swaps will be unobtainable for new debt.
The Spanish and Italian loans may hang longer.
Cypress will default.  The Russians will not be happy.
The pressure for Germany to leave the Euro will build.
German foreign trade will tank.
The US markets may spike up.
At this point I am guessing.

Paul Krugman has published a paper at the Financial Times.

OPINION 8:32pm

A manifesto for economic sense

Western policy makers are inflicting suffering on their peoples, write Paul Krugman and Richard Layard

Pay walled.


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/

Banks face billions of dollars of claims after Barclays settles

Damages claims running to billions of dollars against the world’s biggest banks have been given fresh “credibility” by Barclays £290m Libor settlement, lawyers said.
27 Jun 2012
| 3 Comments

Merkel dismisses Spain and Italy's pleas for aid

Pleas from Spain and Italy for urgent financial aid from the eurozone to bring down borrowing costs were dismissed by Angela Merkel as divisions hardened on the eve of a critical summit.
27 Jun 2012
| 358 Comments

Debt crisis: as it happened - June 27, 2012

Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande meet in Paris to try to square their differences over the debt crisis after the German chancellor ruled out eurobonds for 'as long as I live'.
27 Jun 2012
| 736 Comments

Angela Merkel isn't bluffing; like everyone else in Europe, she's defending national sovereignty

You turn if you want to. The lady's not for turning. No, not Mrs Thatcher, but Angela Merkel, the latest big beast of the European political scene to dig her heels in and refuse to go along with the international consensus.
27 Jun 2012
| 107 Comments

David Cameron under pressure to veto EU power grab

David Cameron is under pressure to use his veto to block a EU power grab to supervise the City of London and to wrest wider concessions at a Brussels summit on Thursday.
27 Jun 2012
| 35 Comments

Spain cannot finance itself for long, says PM Mariano Rajoy

Spain's prime minister warned that his country cannot continue to finance itself and he called for Europe to move urgently to reduce unsustainably high interest rates.
27 Jun 2012
| 16 Comments

EU Summit: schedule

The EU Summit begins on Thursday amid growing concerns over the financial health of Greece, Spain and Italy. Here is the schedule for the two-day event.
27 Jun 2012
| 4 Comments

EU Summit: invitation letter

The EU Summit begins on Thursday amid growing concerns over the financial health of Greece, Spain and Italy. Here is the invitational letter to the event, written by European Council President Herman Van Rompuy.
27 Jun 2012
| 1 Comment

Homeless charity 'swamped' by eurozone migrants

Charity calls on Government to restrict immigration after being "swamped" with destitute people fleeing eurozone.
27 Jun 2012

Trader Jerome Kerviel faces five years in prison

Prosecutor in the re-trial of French trader Jerome Kerviel, who's appealing his conviction for covering up billions of euros in losses, asks for a new guilty verdict and a five-year prison term.
27 Jun 2012

Angela Merkel: No quick and easy solution to debt crisis

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has insisted that there is no quick and easy solution to the eurozone debt crisis.
27 Jun 2012
| 11 Comments

Microsoft headquarters in Greece attacked

Assailants attacked the offices of online giant in Athens, driving a van through the front doors and setting off an incendiary device.
27 Jun 2012

Middle-income families hit hardest by recession

Families faced biggest squeeze on household incomes since the 1930s.
27 Jun 2012
| 140 Comments

The benefits of selective eurozone default

There is a consensus in the corridors of power that if any eurozone member defaults or leaves, contagion and collapse are assured. This is a fairy tale designed to frighten voters into submission to bizarre government policies. It also ignores two historical lessons.
27 Jun 2012
| 43 Comments


"The benefits of selective eurozone default

One is that sovereign default is normal, especially after major banking crises. Only 13 of the G20 countries (the world's wealthiest nations) existed a century ago.
Of these, only two have not defaulted. Many have repeatedly reneged. The other is that default can be beneficial. Markets already expect several EU countries to 'restructure', hence Greek and Portuguese 10-year government bonds are now worth 16pc and 65pc of their face value; but discussion remains a political heresy because the eurozone has some aspects of a religious cult. The result is an absence of analysis on how to manage the cyclical inevitability of default, or to reap the benefits.
It is also worth noting that for many countries default is their normal condition. Spain is the winner, officially defaulting 18 times since 1550. Greece has done so five times since its re-creation in the 1820s, and has been barred international borrowing for 110 years out of the last 190.
The architects of the euro created an interdependent economic area so that never again could there be a war across Europe. They knew a single currency before political union carried risks so built in financial controls. The breakdown occurred when France and Germany waived the budget deficit rules in 2003 fearing the electoral consequences. From then on, a crisis was inevitable.
Elections across Europe now show an anti-EU trend because of its new association with financial pain: previously voters signed up for the money - low interest rates, unimaginably easy credit, rising income and house prices. The Poles and Czechs never conceived they would be asked to pay in; the Mediterranean periphery never expected to repay overseas donations. The risk/reward for these nations has tilted towards leaving, the more so given the potential benefits.
The economies of all five 'PIIGS' [Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain] are contracting. The longer they remain within the eurozone, the more local deposits, foreign investors and industry will flee. Soaring unemployment, mass emigration, deflation and social unrest are guaranteed. Recovery post-default is always driven by a reversal of previous capital flows: deposits return into the system; foreign businesses see the opportunity of cheap wages and a weak currency; governments are keen to smooth their path so regulations are waived. Investors suddenly become interested in building factories and buying assets. Tourists find the exchange rate compelling and arrive in droves. Service companies (which can be based anywhere) find the case for relocation compelling.
Currently the PIIGS are aid junkies. The cure for addiction is not to increase the dose as it prevents necessary structural changes. Default will be painful yet this should be brief as it allows reform to take place. The precedents are good, one suffices. 2012 marks the 15th anniversary of Asia's bone-jarring economic collapse; most countries bordering the Pacific underwent some form of default, even China at the provincial level. The problems were artificially high exchange rates and excessive debt. In 1997, it was inconceivable that within 15 years Asia would account for four-fifths of the world's foreign exchange reserves, or 60pc of commodity imports. Rightly so as it only took ten - because there was simultaneous reform. In contrast, Argentina has defaulted three times since 1982 but has never restructured because of its strange Peronist legacy. The world's sixth richest country on a per capita basis in 1914, today its fails to make the top 50.
There are major opportunities in crises and defaults, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 which effectively doubled the number of global consumers overnight and resulted in a fifteen-year equity bull market and high growth in real income. Asia's financial crash in 1997 proved another. Today Greece's entire stock market is capitalised at $20bn, less than 5pc the value and 0.5pc of a single day's turnover in Apple. Italian opportunities are potentially greater. It is premature to place bets on the PIIGS today because of the EU's amazing record of dither and delay. Yet decision making has already passed to voters; the priority for national politicians is re-election so rapid changes are imminent. The result should be long overdue reform and economic renaissance, provided the dead hands of government incompetence are temporarily severed.
Jonathan Compton, Managing Director, Bedlam Asset Management."


Very conservative but not wrong if the pain can be tolerated.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/debt-crisis

http://www.spiegel.de/international/topic/debt_crisis


'Self Deception and Sham Solutions': Merkel Blasts Euro Partners on Eve of Summit

'Self Deception and Sham Solutions' Merkel Blasts Euro Partners on Eve of Summit

SPIEGEL ONLINE - June 27, 2012 German Chancellor Angela Merkel has signalled she is ready for a fight at Thursday's summit, criticizing the euro reform blueprint presented by top EU officials and again ruling out jointly issued debt in the strongest of terms. She warned that Germany can't save the euro on its own. more...
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Tragic Decline of Gibraltar's Spanish Neighbor

Between a Rock and a Hard Place The Tragic Decline of Gibraltar's Spanish Neighbor

SPIEGEL ONLINE - June 27, 2012 Many places in Spain are suffering as a result of the euro crisis, but few have been hit as hard as La Línea, a Spanish town which neighbors the prosperous British overseas territory of Gibraltar. With the city on the verge of bankruptcy, many residents have turned to smuggling to earn money. By Walter Mayr in La Línea, Spain more... Forum ]
Window Dressing for Hollande: The Empty Promise of Europe's 'Growth Pact'

Window Dressing for Hollande The Empty Promise of Europe's 'Growth Pact'

SPIEGEL ONLINE - June 27, 2012 French President François Hollande promised his voters a growth pact to counteract Germany's obsession with austerity. Now, he has gotten what he asked for, nominally at least. But the pact, which will be agreed to at this week's EU summit, is full of hot air. By Carsten Volkery more...
The World From Berlin: 'States Must Sacrifice Sovereignty to Save Euro'

The World From Berlin 'States Must Sacrifice Sovereignty to Save Euro'

SPIEGEL ONLINE - June 27, 2012 Do European leaders trust each other enough to take the steps necessary to secure the long-term existence of the euro? German commentators warn that fundamental questions must be answered at Thursday's EU summit. more...
The Coming EU Summit Clash: Merkel Vows 'No Euro Bonds as Long as I Live'

The Coming EU Summit Clash Merkel Vows 'No Euro Bonds as Long as I Live'

SPIEGEL ONLINE - June 27, 2012 German Chancellor Angela Merkel has come out stronger than ever against euro-zone debt sharing, telling a group of parliamentarians that there would be no euro bonds "as long as I live." Her tough stance guarantees conflict with Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti at this week's pivotal EU summit in Brussels. more...
George Soros on the Euro Crisis: 'A Tragic, Historical Mistake by the Germans'

George Soros on the Euro Crisis 'A Tragic, Historical Mistake by the Germans'

SPIEGEL ONLINE - June 26, 2012 With the EU summit set to start on Thursday, pressure is on European leaders to find a way out of the euro crisis. Investor George Soros is pessimistic that a solution will be found and says time is extremely short. In an interview with SPIEGEL ONLINE, he warns that Germany could develop into a hated, imperial power. more...


Passing The Trash - Again

Bruce Krasting's picture



I participated in a slow motion disaster back in the early 80’s. I was working for the global powerhouse, Citibank. Walter Wriston was running the show at the time. He “famously” said “Countries don’t go bankrupt.” His thinking resulted in an enormous increase in the bank’s exposure to global sovereign lending.
All of the big global banks followed Citi’s direction. It was one big party. All the bankers were headed to Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. They all had checks ready to sign. Of course, the countries were more than willing to take on more debt.
It was in 1980 that the thinking was forced to change inside Citi. The sovereign loan portfolio  was getting too big too fast. The bank had internal country limits and those limits were filling up fast. The worst thing that can happen to a banker is to reach a lending ceiling. The real return for lending to these countries was not the Libor+1 pricing, it was the front end fees from new loans that fed the bonus pools.
The solution was simple. Sell the loans that were already on the books to make room for the new ones (and the related origination fees). Who did we sell the loans to? Anyone we could, but we created demand from smaller, US regional banks.We sold them sub-participations in sovereign loans.
In August of 1982 the lights went out. All the big sovereign customers of Citi went bust in the course of a few months. The losses at Citi damn near shuttered the bank (many of the big banks were in the same condition). There were no more big fees coming in, and the losses were mounting. What was once a great place to work, became a terrible place, so I left and joined Drexel in 1985.
I spent the next five years buying back the loans that I had sold to the regional banks. At Citi, I had sold the loans at par to regional banks, at Drexel I bought them back from those same banks at 20 cents on the dollar.
Note: During this period I was not a “decider”. A “cog in a wheel”, is a better description of my role in this story. There were thousands of “cogs”, together we produced a crisis that cost hundreds of billions, wrecked a good number of banks and produced what is now called, “The Lost Decade”.
This story is important because it is happening again today. Money Center banks are reducing their holdings of risky loans. The regional banks are increasing exposure.
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It’s not just the big US money center banks that are selling. The EU banks are having a fire sale:
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Once again, the trash is headed downhill. It won't end any differently this time. I looked at my old Rolodex of banks that I both sold and bought bad loans from. Very few of them are alive today. Nothing has changed. Surprised?
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http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/06/links-62712.html

Links 6/27/12

Dear readers, our Matt Stoller is a writing for and performing in (as a straight man, natch) a new comedy show on FX starring Russell Brand. It’s called Brand X and starts June 28th at 11 PM Eastern. Although I’m not privy to details, I believe it will push the bounds of discourse beyond the acceptable (as in barely left) margin defined by Paul Krugman and Jon Stewart. Be sure to catch it!
Condors threatened by ‘epidemic’ lead poisoning from hunters’ bullets Christian Science Monitor
South Korea to ban catching of dolphins for shows PhysOrg
The amazing iguana which can stay underwater for half an hour – to feed from the bottom of the ocean Daily Mail (May S)
Google team: Self-teaching computers recognize cats PhysOrg (Robert M)
Roman coin hoard found BBC (John M)
Healing Spirits Lapham’s Quarterly (Aquifer)
Drug War is Fueling the Global HIV Pandemic Alternet (furzy mouse)
5 Ways Email Can Completely Ruin Your Life Alternet
Facebook changed your e-mail address, here’s how you can change it back CNET (furzy mouse). Haha, no Facebook here!
Manic Nation: Why Americans Are Anxious, Stressed, Depressed and Fat (And What We Can Do About It) Alternet (Aquifer)
Chart: What Killed Us, Then and Now Atlantic (Carol B)
Death by suburban sprawl: better urban planning will combat sedentary lifestyles The Conversation (May S)
As Congress looks away, U.S. tiptoes toward exporting a gas bounty Reuters
‘Supreme leader’ is fascist Tehelka (May S). And in case you think the headline is over the top: Hindu Nationalist’s Historical Links to Nazism and Fascism International Business Times
China’s, ahem, “stabilising trade” MacroBusiness
Tax scandal reaches No.10 as it’s revealed Cameron’s spin doctor helped run ‘avoidance’ scheme for BBC presenter wife Daily Mail (May S). Fact set is so bad DM can get away with a straightforward and relatively short headline.
Will European Peripheral Sovereigns be Monetized? Russ Winter
Monti lashes out at Germany ahead of summit Financial Times
Robert Mundell, evil genius of the euro Greg Palast, Guardian (Aquifer)
Look beyond summits for euro salvation Martin Wolf, Financial Times
Spanish Officials Hailed Banks as Crisis Built New York Times
US home prices rise for third month Financial Times versus Home Prices In U.S. Cities Fall At Slowest Pace Since ’10 Bloomberg
The Mixed Economy Manifesto: Part 1 New Economic Perspectives. Not a bad program, but the tone is defensive, which is understandable given how neoclassical economics dominates academia and the MSM. IMHO, the opponents need a more direct line of attack. Maybe the simplest is that neoclassical economics assumes no actor has any power (they acknowledge but then largely ignore monopolists and oligopolists). Since both buyers and sellers have varying degrees of power, this means neoclassical economics is flat out irrelevant.
Breaking Up Big Banks Hard To Do As Market Forces Fail Bloomberg. This is not hard to understand. Bank CEO pay is highly correlated with size of balance sheet.
Yes, there is an alternative to capitalism: Mondragon shows the way Guardian (Aquifer)
Pro-business and pro-markets are different MacroBusiness


http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/d-day/?ref=opinion

The most useful way to read a Supreme Court decision, I figured out years ago, is to start with the dissents. That way, you can proceed to the majority opinion as a better informed reader, with the full range of possibilities in view: What arguments did the majority reject? Which did it respond to, and which did it not even bother to acknowledge? Most important, what was the disagreement really about?
Taking that approach to the Arizona immigration decision the court issued on Monday, it is pellucidly clear from the dissenting opinions of Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr. that Arizona lost big and that the decision amounted not to the split decision of early news reports but a major reaffirmation of federal authority. There has been considerable attention to Justice Scalia’s political rant – which he delivered from the bench as well as on paper — against President Obama’s immigration policies. It was a cringe-making screed for sure, even if not altogether surprising given that Justice Scalia had actually stooped to invoking the broccoli threat during the health care argument.
But aside from his self-indulgent posturing, what was most revealing about Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion was what passed for actual legal analysis, his charge that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s majority opinion was so dismissive of Arizona’s effort to “protect its sovereignty” through the invalidated provisions of S.B. 1070, the law that was at issue, that “we should cease referring to it as a sovereign state.”
Pretty strong stuff. I turned to the majority opinion with mounting anticipation. What on earth had the court done? The first thing that jumped out at me was the name of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. on Justice Kennedy’s opinion, along with the expected names of Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. The chief justice was, apparently, in complete agreement with the majority as evidenced by his silence – the dog that didn’t bark, you might say. He felt no need to write separately to express even a shade of difference from the majority or a hint of sympathy with the dissenting views of his usual allies. Beyond Justice Scalia’s transparent dislike for the president, perhaps it was the chief justice’s apostasy that drove him around the bend.
In fact, Chief Justice Roberts has never shown himself to be a nativist (not for him the description offered by Justice Scalia of Arizona’s citizens who feel “under siege by large numbers of illegal immigrants who invade their property, strain their social services, and even place their lives in jeopardy”). More to the point, this man of the Beltway and veteran of the White House counsel’s office has never assumed the guise of a committed states-righter. He shares many of the views of his mentor and predecessor, the late Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, but an appetite for reigniting the federalism wars hasn’t seemed to be one of them, at least not yet.
There is one passage in Justice Kennedy’s opinion that struck me as notably – although not unduly – mistrustful of the state’s motives. It was in the portion declaring unconstitutional Section 6 of S.B. 1070, which authorized local police to arrest, without a warrant, someone they had probable cause to believe had committed a deportable offense – in other words, turning Arizona police into immigration police. “This would allow the state to achieve its own immigration policy,” Justice Kennedy wrote, adding that “the result could be unnecessary harassment of some aliens” whom the federal government would elect not to deport.
“Unnecessary harassment” is a harsh prediction. There were undoubtedly other ways to explain why the state shouldn’t be given the authority it had grabbed: state police officers might make mistakes, there might be misunderstandings. But “unnecessary harassment”? This dump on Arizona, from a justice who has written expansively in the past about the “dignity” and sovereignty of the states, didn’t seem to bother the chief justice a bit.
All of which, of course, leads to the question: what about the health care decision?
Since this column will be coexisting in cyberspace with the court’s Affordable Care Act ruling, due on Thursday morning, it’s undoubtedly foolhardy to repeat my prediction that the court will uphold the law. Well there, I just did.
Chief Justice Roberts was not completely silent on Monday. He filed an opinion dissenting from the court’s other decision that day, Miller v. Alabama, which barred mandatory sentences of life without parole for those convicted of committing murder before the age of 18. Noting that the federal government and most states have such sentencing laws on their books, the chief justice criticized the court’s majority for having failed to “display our usual respect for elected officials.” Courts “must presume an Act of Congress is constitutional” barring some obvious reason it isn’t, he said, citing a 19th-century precedent for that proposition. And quoting the 1976 Supreme Court decision that reauthorized capital punishment, he said there was a “heavy burden” on “those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of the people.”
The court heard argument in the life-without-parole case during the same March sitting in which it heard the Affordable Care Act case – which at its core comes down to the authority of judges to substitute their views on matters of economic policy for those of the people’s elected representatives. There were other grounds on which to object to Justice Kagan’s majority opinion — Justices Thomas and Alito found some in their separate dissenting opinions – so it’s of at least passing interest that the chief justice chose a theme of judicial deference to legislative policy choices.
Thursday promises to be a rare day of Supreme Court theater. While there are frequent dramatic moments at the court, they occur randomly, because the justices don’t announce in advance which decisions they will hand down on a given day. But once a decade or so, the last day of the term arrives with a momentous case still undecided, so there is no secret about what the day holds in store. I remember the almost unbearable tension in the courtroom on June 29, 1992, when Planned Parenthood v. Casey was due to be decided and there was a distinct prospect that the court would use that case to overturn Roe v. Wade.
And on June 26, 2003, everyone knew the court would announce its decision in Lawrence v. Texas, the gay rights case. Gay members of the Supreme Court bar, a number of them former law clerks, filled the bar section of the courtroom, and some wept openly as Justice Kennedy announced that Bowers v. Hardwick had been wrongly decided 17 years earlier and that gay men and lesbians were “entitled to respect for their private lives.”
If there are tears in the courtroom on June 28, 2012, will they be tears of relief, or of regret? And whose?"


http://earlywarn.blogspot.com/2012/06/latest-us-drought-map-and-colorado.html

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Latest US Drought Map and Colorado

We are long overdue to catch up on the map of the Palmer Drought Severity Index.  Above is the version for June 23rd.  As you can see, much of the interior west is in extreme drought conditions, and has also been suffering a record breaking heat-wave (even though it's not the height of summer yet):
Record highs continue to fall Tuesday afternoon in the central U.S., where Denver, Colorado had its fifth consecutive day of triple-digit heat after it reached 100°F at 1pm MDT, and could continue to rise this afternoon. This ties the all-time record for consecutive 100°F+ days. Nebraska and Kansas are particularly toasty this afternoon; McCook, Nebraska has reached 113°F so far, and Hill City, Kansas is up to 112°F. Though, to put that in perspective, the state record for Nebraska is 118°F, and the state record for Kansas is 121°F.

The heat moves east tomorrow, and by Thursday, many of the major Midwest cities are forecast to be in the triple-digits, including Chicago, St. Louis, and Indianapolis.
The consequences are ugly:
A wildfire raging near some of Colorado's most popular tourist sites grew suddenly more ferocious on Tuesday, forcing 32,000 people from their homes, prompting evacuations from the U.S. Air Force Academy and swallowing numerous houses at the edge of Colorado Springs.

The fire was "shaping up as one of the biggest disasters in Colorado history," the Denver Post reported.

From the vantage point of a command post about 10 miles from the path of advancing flames, the entire community of Mountain Shadows, a northwest subdivision of Colorado Springs, appeared to be enveloped in an orange glow after dark.

"This is a fire of epic proportions," Colorado Springs Fire Chief Rich Brown told Reuters as ash drifted down on the city, sirens wailed and the thick smell of smoke permeated the air.

The stubborn and towering wildfire had jumped firefighters' perimeter lines in the hills overlooking Colorado Springs.

"We have homes burning right now," El Paso County Sheriff Terry Maketa said Tuesday night, according to the Denver Post.

The sheriff was among those forced from home by the fire, the newspaper added.

"It was like looking at the worst movie set you could imagine," Gov. John Hickenlooper said after flying over the 9-square-mile fire late Tuesday. "It's almost surreal. You look at that, and it's like nothing I've seen before."
There are also fires threatening Boulder and (recently) Fort Collins.  My heart goes out to those suffering in these disasters.

Still, it would be remiss not to remind readers of this map from the report Global Climate Change: Impacts in the United States

It shows the number of days over 100oF expected in the later part of this century under business-as-usual carbon emissions.

What is happening in Colarado Springs at present, and what happened to Texas last summer, is going to happen to most of the country in coming decade.

There is work to be done.

Sooner is better.  As soon as you can is best.
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Wednesday, June 27, 2012

00:17, 6/27/12

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The quiet before the storm.

Found at the guardian:




François Hollande and Angela Merkel meet in Paris with high stakes at play

Franco-German discussions need to build 'a concrete path' for Europe, says José Manuel Barroso
"Chancellor Angela Merkel goes to Paris on Wednesday to try to strike a Franco-German deal with President François Hollande amid deep-seated differences at what has been described as Europe's defining moment.
With the two key EU countries split for the first time in 30 months of single currency and sovereign debt crisis, José Manuel Barroso, head of the European Commission laid bare the high stakes in play at an EU summit in Brussels on Thursday as well as the high frictions between Germany and France.
Merkel's first visit to the Élysée Palace under its new occupant has been hastily arranged and comes on the eve of what is being billed as a crucial Brussels summit which, apart from the immediate financial dilemmas, is to wrestle with a radical blueprint aimed at turning the 17 countries of the eurozone into a fully-fledged political federation within a decade.
"We must articulate the vision of where Europe must go, and a concrete path for how to get there," warned Barroso. But he was unsure "whether the urgency of this is fully understood in all the capitals of the EU".
Since his election last month, France's socialist leader has quickly emerged as the most formidable challenger to German formulas for Europe's salvation after two years of Berlin largely dictating the EU response to the crisis.
Merkel is feeling bruised, having just withstood two unusual attempts by fellow leaders to ambush her and get Berlin to hand over its credit cards to write off what they see as other countries' profligacy.
In Mexico last week at the G20 and then in Rome at two bad-tempered summits in recent days, the Americans and the British – in cahoots with the leaders of France, Spain and Italy – sought to press Merkel into bankrolling fiscal stimulus and bank recapitalisation policies that would cut the vulnerable eurozone countries' cost of borrowing.
"It was all wishful thinking or a political game," said a senior EU official of the ambush attempts. "There are substantial economic and political interests at play. Governments are spinning in their respective interests."
The pressure on Merkel may have backfired and reinforced German resistance to the ideas. The view in Berlin is that Hollande will have to back down amid the relative weakness of the French economy.
The blueprint unveiled on Tuesday calls for a eurozone political federation to be built over a decade entailing four stages. The details are thin and are to be fleshed out by the end of the year by the heads of four of the main European institutions, but the proposals – a response to the Greek drama that erupted 30 months ago and which has engulfed the EU into its most perilous crisis ever – mark the most ambitious European plan since agreement on the single currency was reached at Maastricht 20 years ago.
Thursday marks the start of what will be a long, exhausting, and bruising battle essentially pitting German-led integrationist pressure against French-led protection of sovereign authority and reluctance to cede immense powers over budgets and tax-and-spend policies to Brussels and a new eurozone finance ministry, proposals that also raise fundamental questions about democratic legitimacy in the EU.
To be realised, the "political union" would require a major legal overhaul, reopening EU treaties, endless quarrels, probably a new German constitution and perhaps a referendum in Britain and its departure from the EU.
"These decisions on deeper economic, financial and fiscal integration imply major changes to the way our citizens are governed and to the way their taxes are spent," said Barroso. "This crisis is the biggest threat to all that we have achieved through European construction over the last 60 years… A big leap forward is now needed."
The proposals, likely to expose fundamental splits over Europe's future, will do little to resolve the immediate debt and currency crisis. The hope is that the medium-term master plan will placate the financial markets by demonstrating political resolve to defend the currency at all costs. The risk is that the leaders will appear so divided that the markets might step up their probing of the weaker bits of the eurozone, notably Spain and Italy.
Without a Franco-German accord, the prospects of a damaging summit in Brussels are high. Last week Hollande issued policy proposals for the summit, a growth and jobs pact whose details are anathema to Berlin – the issue of short-term shared eurozone debt leading to full pooled debt, common eurozone guarantees for bank deposits, protectionist measures favouring European manufacturers and bidders for public contracts over outsiders as well as direct eurozone recapitalisation of dodgy banks without increasing national debt levels.
The Germans feel under pressure, but Merkel will court big trouble at home if she yields. A pro-European commentator in Der Spiegel this week suggested she should sacrifice her political career to save Europe and the currency.
There is little chance of that happening. But the German elite is deeply worried about Hollande's France, because of the impact it could have on the German economy's prospects battling the emerging might of China, India or Brazil.
Berlin's angst is that Europe can only be saved and a successful Europe re-established if the two core countries are in harness, that it cannot bear the burden alone, and that if the Franco-German dynamic dissipates, the German economy will be among the biggest victims of failure.
Berlin points to the widening gap in employment costs between Germany and France; a youth unemployment rate in France triple that of Germany; Hollande's first move in reducing the retirement age and France's overall loss of competitiveness over the past decade. It fears being dragged down as a result. The cautious hope is that Hollande will turn out or be forced to be France's Gerhard Schröder, the ex-German chancellor and, like Hollande, a social democrat who executed the economic, welfare, and structural reforms a decade ago that put Germany in its current strong shape.
Hollande heads a socialist party, however, that is a lot less "modernised" than Schröder's SPD or the Labour Party under Blair and which is eternally split over Europe. Hollande's foreign minister, Laurent Fabius, spearheaded the No campaign in the French referendum that sunk the European constitution in 2005.
And the crisis is throwing into sharp relief the basic divisions, particularly on the grand plan being fought over . A crisis that started financially on the EU's periphery, in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, has now shifted politically to the union's heart, the Berlin-Paris axis.
France may baulk at the blueprint being tabled, being deeply reluctant to surrender so much sovereign power to new eurozone authorities, while Germany will only accept the liability for others being thrust on it if the powers are federalised.
A senior EU diplomat intimately involved in the Franco-German dynamic for 20 years says, however, that Merkel and Hollande are condemned to forging a modus operandi and that the stakes are too big.
"Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand were dreadful at the start. They hated each other. Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac was the lowest I ever saw. It's always like this with France and Germany," he said.
"They always represent different positions and then they find a compromise that everyone else agrees with except the UK.""


http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jun/26/cyprus-request-bailout-raises-fear-contagion

"
Cypriot president Demetris Christofias (R) shakes hands with Stefan Fule, the EU commissioner on enlargement and European neighbourhood policy in Nicosia, Cyprus. Photograph: Katia Christodoulou/EPA
The timing could not be worse. Just days before Cyprus is due to take up the European Union's presidency and the task of guiding Europe out of its financial crises, it has become the fifth eurozone member to request a Brussels bailout.
It does not bode well that a bailout country is now mandated with securing agreement on the financial framework of Europe's budget for the next seven years. The Germans have already started to make noises about Cyprus holding the presidency while trying to negotiate a loan. But the government has chosen to draw attention to itself, and the plight of its economy, by waiting until the last moment to ask for a little help from its friends.
There was time to apply for a bailout in an orderly fashion, but Cyprus waited until it was pushed into a corner – after negotiations for a loan from Russia or China failed – and the world's media is, unsurprisingly, zoning in on the sticky situation – hardly the best way to encourage investor confidence, or show that Cyprus is a capable player on the European stage.
Cyprus is the eurozone's third smallest economy, but has managed to make the whole of Europe twitch over the possibility of the contagion spreading across the single currency bloc.
The Mediterranean island was undone by a banking sector heavily exposed to debt-paralysed Greece and a write-down of Greek bonds, which hit Cypriot banks hard, pushing Nicosia to seek help just as it picks up the six-month rotating presidency.
For weeks, if not months, the government – led by communist leader President Demetris Christofias – gave the impression it was doing everything possible to avoid going cap in hand to the EU. But finally, with time running out to recapitalise the island's second largest bank, Cyprus Popular, the cash-strapped government ran out of quick-fix options.
A vocal opposition has already criticised Christofias for dawdling over fresh austerity measures while the economic landscape worsened. In a highly unusual move, former central bank governor Athanasios Orphanides accused the president of trying to destroy the banking system in an open letter, saying he was discrediting the banking system by blaming the island's economic woes solely on exposure to Greek debt. Orphanides – who was replaced by Christofias when his five-year term ended in April – argued that fiscal slippage and delays reforming an unwieldy public sector were part of the problem. The president was also chastised for supporting a severe 75% write-down on Greek debt with his European colleagues.
Cyprus still hasn't ruled out borrowing from a third country to soften the blow of the bailout conditions.
In 2011 the island avoided having to apply for EU aid by securing a €2.5bn Russian loan to cover debt refinancing for that year. But Cyprus's ailing €17.3bn economy is now expected to need an injection of €10bn. The recession-hit economy is struggling with record unemployment of more than 10%, austerity measures, and trying to rein in a deficit which is twice the EU's limit of 3% of GDP. Finance minister Vassos Shiarly has suggested that the bailout cash required is not just to prop up a relatively large banking system but to cover the state's fiscal requirements.
Government spokesman Stefanos Stefanou has tried to allay fears that the terms of the bailout would be harsh for Cypriots, saying the island's cherished 10% corporate tax rate remains safe from European tinkering. Moreover, the Cyprus Central Bank backs the government's move to request a bailout as it would protect its Greek-exposed banking sector from further contagion.
The bailout request was triggered when Fitch Ratings downgraded Cyprus's sovereign ratings, saying this was "principally due to Greek corporate and household exposures of the largest three banks – Bank of Cyprus, Cyprus Popular Bank and Hellenic Bank".
But Cyprus has been unable to borrow from international markets since 2011, after being reduced to junk status by two of the three international credit agencies.
Although the government is committed to reducing its bloated deficit from 6.4% to below 3%, it is reluctant to introduce deeper public cuts to drastically slash the deficit.
Which leaves an island that prided itself on prosperity bracing itself to take its medicine as one of Europe's ailing nations."


The Euro is a disaster and should end. 

It looks to be toast.

Der Speigel:



Endangered Currency

First Greece -- then Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal: The European common currency has come under pressure from large national debts and the effects of the global financial crisis, ultimately requiring a rescue package close to a trillion euros.
George Soros on the Euro Crisis: 'A Tragic, Historical Mistake by the Germans'

George Soros on the Euro Crisis 'A Tragic, Historical Mistake by the Germans'

SPIEGEL ONLINE - June 26, 2012 With the EU summit set to start on Thursday, pressure is on European leaders to find a way out of the euro crisis. Investor George Soros is pessimistic that a solution will be found and says time is extremely short. In an interview with SPIEGEL ONLINE, he warns that Germany could develop into a hated, imperial power. more...

"
SPIEGEL ONLINE: In Germany, once the motor of European integration, people are openly discussing the possibility of leaving the euro zone. Many Germans believe that a return to the deutschmark would be cheaper than to remain stuck in a flawed currency union. Are they right?

Soros: There is no question that a breakup of the euro would be very damaging, very costly, both financially and politically. And the biggest loss would be incurred by Germany. Germans have to bear in mind that, effectively, they have suffered practically no losses so far. Transfers have all been in the form of loans, and it is only when the loans are not repaid that real losses will be incurred. SPIEGEL ONLINE: In surveys, though, most Germans no longer believe that loans granted to Greece or other nations will ever be repaid. They worry that Germany is simply on the hook for the rest of Europe.
Soros: But that would be the case only if the euro broke up. We have witnessed a tremendous capital flight, not only from Greece but also from Italy and Spain. All those transfers would result in claims by the banks of the creditor countries against the central banks of the debtor countries in the Euroclear System, the TARGET 2. I believe that claims by the Bundesbank will exceed a trillion euros by the end of this year.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Should the euro zone collapse, these claims could become virtually worthless. Is Chancellor Angela Merkel just bluffing when she flirts with the idea of a German euro-zone exit?
Soros: Germany could leave, but it would be incredibly costly. I just read the report of the German Finance Ministry, which estimates the costs of a euro-zone exit in terms of employment and economic activity, both of which are real. Because this is the case, Germany will always do the minimum to preserve the euro. Doing the minimum, though, will perpetuate the situation where the debtor countries in Europe have to pay tremendous premiums to refinance their debt. The result will be a Europe in which Germany is seen as an imperial power that will not be loved and admired by the rest of Europe -- but hated and resisted, because it will perceived as an oppressive power.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Why should Germany carry all the blame? After all, other EU nations shied away from necessary structural reforms and lived beyond their means.
Soros: There is no doubt that the countries that now have a very large debt have not introduced the kind of structural reforms that Germany did and are therefore at a disadvantage. But the problem is that this disadvantage is becoming even more pronounced through the punitive policies in place now. Italy currently has to spend 6 percent of its GDP every year just to stay even with Germany because it has to pay so much more to refinance its debt. There is no way, with that handicap, that Italy can close the competitiveness gap with Germany.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Once again: How is that Germany's fault?
Soros: This is the joint responsibility of everyone who was involved in the introduction of the euro without understanding the consequences. When the euro was introduced, the regulators allowed banks to buy unlimited amounts of government bonds without setting aside any equity capital. And the European Central Bank discounted all government bonds on equal terms. So commercial banks found it advantageous to accumulate the bonds of the weaker countries to earn a few extra basis points.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: And that then dragged down interest rates?
Soros: Yes. The lower interest rates fueled housing and consumption booms in countries such as Spain and Ireland. At the same time, Germany, struggling with the burdens of reunification, tightened its belt and became more competitive. All this led to a wide divergence in economic performance. Europe became divided into creditor and debtor countries. All these conditions were created by European authorities, including the European Central Bank, which was largely modeled after the Bundesbank. Germans tend to forget now that the euro was largely a Franco-German creation. No country has benefited more from the euro than Germany, both politically and economically. Therefore what has happened as a result of the introduction of the euro is largely Germany's Schuld -- its responsibility.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Germans remember the birth of the euro very differently. They felt they had to give up the deutschmark in order to get other European Union nations to agree to German reunification.
Soros: True. The integration of Europe was very much led by a Germany that was always willing to pay a little bit extra to reach a compromise that everybody accepted, because Germany was so eager to get European support for reunification. That was called the "farsighted vision," which created the European Union.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Do we need a similar vision today?
Soros: I want to draw the parallel between what is happening with the euro zone right now, and what happened after World War II, when the Bretton Woods system of monetary management was created to govern the global economy. Then, America became the center of this system, and the dollar became the dominant global currency. It was a free world dominated by America. But America earned that position by providing huge funds for the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan. America became a benevolent imperial power, which greatly benefited America.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: How can that situation be compared to the one in which we find ourselves today?
Soros: Germany is in a similar position today, but it is not willing to engage in anything like the Marshall Plan. It is opposed to any transfer union for the rest of Europe.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: The Marshall Plan, though significant, amounted to just a small share of the US gross domestic product. The potential payouts related to a euro rescue program, on the other hand, might be more than Germany can handle.
Soros: Nonsense. The more comprehensive and convincing a debt reduction program is, the less likely it is to fail. And remember, just as Germany is grateful to America for the Marshall Plan, Italy would be grateful to Germany for helping it lower its refinancing costs. If it did that, Germany could set the conditions. And Italy would be happy to meet those conditions, because it would benefit from it. Not to recognize this opportunity is a tragic, historical mistake by the Germans.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Why did Americans support the Marshall Plan then while Germans now back Merkel's tough push for austerity?
Soros: America felt victorious and generous after World War II. They had also learned from the mistakes after World War I when they imposed punishment on Germany. What became of Germany? A Nazi dictatorship which threatened the world. Today's Germany doesn't feel as prosperous and generous as America then. But actually, Germany still is very prosperous.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: It is precisely that prosperity that Germans are fearful of losing.
Soros: The German position is simply short-sighted. Currently, there is no sign of a crisis in Germany. But if the euro crisis is not resolved quickly, Germany will very soon begin to feel the global decline in economic activity.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: You said a few weeks ago that there were only three months left to overhaul the structure of the currency union.
Soros: Well, we are down to three days now.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Three days?
Soros: Europe's leaders need to take bold steps at the EU summit on Thursday and Friday.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Do you think Angela Merkel is prepared to take such steps?
Soros: She is trapped. Merkel has realized that the euro is not working, but she cannot change the narrative she has created because that narrative has caught the imagination of the German public, and the German public has accepted it.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: The narrative essentially says that crisis-stricken nations simply haven't made the necessary reforms, unlike Germany.
Soros: Right. But at the same time, Chancellor Merkel realizes that what is happening is not working, and so she is determined to preserve the euro.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble gave an interview to SPIEGEL saying that now is the time for bold steps. He outlined ideas for a closer political union in Europe.
Soros: Schäuble is representative of the Germany of Helmut Kohl. He is the last European standing, and he is a tragic figure, because he understands what needs to be done, but he also realizes the obstacles that stand in the way, and he cannot find a way to overcome these obstacles. So he is really suffering.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: What would be your advice to Minister Schäuble?
Soros: The key problem is the debt restructuring in the euro zone. As long as the debt burden is not reduced, there is no chance of the weaker EU countries regaining competitiveness.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: How could that be achieved?
Soros: I propose a European Fiscal Authority which, in partnership with the European Central Bank (ECB), can do what the ECB cannot do on its own. It could establish a Debt Reduction Fund, similar to that proposed by Chancellor Merkel's Council of Economic Advisors and endorsed by the Social Democrats and the Greens. In return for Italy and Spain undertaking specified structural reforms, the Fund would acquire and hold a significant portion of their outstanding stock of debt.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: And where should the money come from to buy up these sovereign bonds?
Soros: The Fund would finance the purchases by issuing European Treasury Bills (eds. Note: a variation on Euro Bonds but with a shorter maturity period) -- a joint obligation of the member countries -- and pass on the benefit of cheap financing to the countries concerned. Such a step would create a more level playing field, because Italy would be able to finance half its debt at 1 percent and the other half would also come down. It would provide real relief to Italy and Spain.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: And once crisis-stricken countries feel that relief, they would cease implementing tougher reforms.
Soros: Quite to the contrary: Reforms would become much easier. It is all about incentives. In the case of Italy, the administration of Prime Minister Mario Monti would like to have much stronger labor market reforms than it is able to push through. If there was a reward of being able to refinance your debt at 1 percent, Monti could push such reforms through.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: But what would happen, for example, should there be a change in government, with the new leaders unwilling to pursue such reforms?
Soros: Then you simply withdraw the concession and suddenly, instead of being able to borrow at 1 percent, the government has to go to the market. And the market is going to punish you. No government could do that without having to pay a heavy price for it.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: But that would push Italy into bankruptcy, a nuclear option that European authorities would never dare to detonate.
Soros: You could adjust the punishment to fit the infraction. Even a small fine would be enough to bring an errant government to heel.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Could such a plan help Greece remain in the euro zone as well?
Soros: Unlikely. Rescuing Greece would require an enormous kind of magnanimity and generosity. The situation there has simply become too poisoned. I think that by standing firm and not compromising on Greece, Angela Merkel would be in a better position to persuade the German public to be more generous toward other nations and distinguish between the good guys and bad guys in Europe.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Would you agree with Merkel's statement that Europe will fail if the euro fails?

Soros: Yes. Because in the long run, you cannot have a common market without a common currency. SPIEGEL ONLINE: If you were still an active investor, would you be tempted to make massive bets against the euro?
Soros: As an investor, I would be very pessimistic, especially about Europe. But as a believer in an open society, I have to put my faith in the people and leaders of Europe to show some reason.
Interview conducted in London by Mathias Müller von Blumencron, Stefan Kaiser and Gregor Peter Schmitz"

This is Soros' position.  It will not happen in three days or three months.
It will not happen.

 
Halting Europe's Downward Spiral: A Master Plan to Save the Euro

Halting Europe's Downward Spiral A Master Plan to Save the Euro

SPIEGEL ONLINE - June 26, 2012 Economics experts from across Europe released a report on Tuesday offering a roadmap to a stable euro. The plan seeks to reconcile German calls for greater fiscal responsibility with the desire of beleaguered Southern European countries to introduce euro bonds. more... Forum ]
High Stakes ahead of Crunch Summit: Euro Crisis Threatens European Way of Life

High Stakes ahead of Crunch Summit Euro Crisis Threatens European Way of Life

SPIEGEL ONLINE - June 26, 2012 European leaders have been muddling through instead of properly tackling the debt crisis. Now it threatens the very foundations of the European Union and could destroy a lifestyle that millions of Europeans take for granted. But the high expectations for this week's summit in Brussels can only be disappointed. By Konstantin von Hammerstein, Ralf Neukirch and Christoph Schult more... Forum ]
The World from Berlin: Germany Debates a Euro Bailout Referendum

The World from Berlin Germany Debates a Euro Bailout Referendum

SPIEGEL ONLINE - June 26, 2012 German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble kicked a political hornets' nest when he suggested to SPIEGEL that a referendum on efforts to save the euro will have to be held sooner or later. German commentators jumped into the debate on Tuesday. more...






Not even "Peace in our time".


BBC:

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The financial Times has a less happy view.


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Sources: FT, Bloomberg, Markit

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/business/economy/why-germany-will-pay-up-to-save-the-euro.html?_r=1&hp



To go by the pronouncements coming out of Germany over the last couple of weeks, you might naturally conclude that the euro is toast. Speaking before Parliament, Chancellor Angela Merkel broadly rejected “counterproductive” proposals to pool Europe’s resources to help floundering Mediterranean nations. Germany’s “strength is not infinite,” she stressed. German voters are even more skeptical than their leaders about financing their “slothful” and “profligate” neighbors. Though most still tell pollsters they want to keep the single currency, almost four-fifths want Greece to leave — oblivious to the chain reaction that Greek departure would unleash against Portugal, Spain and even Italy.
Yet it would be wrong to kiss the euro goodbye just yet. For all of Berlin’s neins, shooting down every serious proposal to address its woes, the German government knows it must ultimately cave and open its wallet to save the single currency.
Berlin’s wall of hostility against bailouts of Europe’s south will be on display this week, when European leaders will again try to cobble together a plan to address their debt crisis. They will discuss Greece’s request to ease the terms of its $217 billion rescue package, as well as proposals to create a regional banking union and Spain’s request for $125 billion to shore up its failing banks.
Berlin will drag its feet as long as it can before offering help, as has been its wont throughout the crisis. It will demand assorted quid pro quos. Last week, the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, warned Greece not to expect much sympathy and demanded that Athens comply with the austerity measures “quickly and without delay.”
But Ms. Merkel knows that Germany must ultimately underwrite the euro’s rescue, pretty much regardless of whether its conditions are satisfied. There are three good reasons. First, the euro has been very good to Germany. Second, the bailout costs are likely to be much lower than most Germans believe. Third, and perhaps most important, the cost to Germany of euro dismemberment would be incalculably high — far more than that of keeping the currency together.
Let’s take the reasons in turn. Germany has had a fairly good crisis so far. Since 2009, when it fell into a deep recession, it has grown faster and suffered less unemployment than almost any other industrialized country. Wages are rising. And exports have rebounded sharply from the crisis to surpass their peak of 2008.
Germany owes much of this to the euro — which tethered its ultracompetitive manufacturing to the mediocre economies of its neighbors. Since the advent of the single currency, Germany’s labor costs have fallen more than 15 percent against the average labor costs of all the countries using the euro, and about 25 percent against those of the troubled nations on the periphery. If it dumped the euro for a new deutsche mark, its exchange rate would surge to make up for the difference, potentially crippling its exports, which have fed most of its economic growth over the last decade.
What about the cost of a bailout? German economists are pushing the story that Germany has already squandered enormous sums on the euro’s survival, going above and beyond the call of duty. Hans-Werner Sinn, who heads the Ifo Institute for Economic Research in Munich, argued in a commentary piece on the Op-Ed page of The New York Times that Germany had given Greece so far the equivalent of 29 times the aid given to West Germany under the Marshall Plan after World War II. His analysis omitted, however, that aid was just a small part of the Marshall Plan’s help to Germany. Most important, the plan also wiped out a majority of Germany’s debt.
While Germany has committed a few hundred billion euros to rescue the currency, if the rescue succeeds, it should recover all of it. And it can readily do more. William R. Cline, an economist at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, told me that covering the entire financing needs of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy through 2015 would cost about $1.6 trillion.
If the International Monetary Fund contributed one-third, Germany and other rich euro area countries would be left to put up the rest. But even if Germany’s share reached $500 billion, it would not forfeit this money. After all, the goal of the bailout would be to prevent defaults. Germany could even turn a profit.
Most economists and policy makers outside Germany agree that keeping Europe’s common currency together over the long term will require a permanent mechanism to pool risk — transferring resources from the euro area’s powerful core to its weaker members. Germany, predictably, has balked at this prospect as way too expensive. Yet German estimates seem exaggerated.
One way to pool risk would be to allow countries to issue “euro bonds,” which would be jointly guaranteed by all the countries in the euro area and thus carry a much lower interest rate than markets are charging countries like Italy and Spain.
Kai Carstensen of the Ifo Institute estimated that euro bonds would end up raising Germany’s annual borrowing costs by 1.9 percent of the country’s gross domestic product — more than $60 billion — because it would pay a higher rate of interest than German bonds do now.
But an analysis by Mr. Cline of the interest rates paid by countries of different credit ratings since the late 1990s suggests a much lower price tag: the borrowing costs of triple-A countries like Germany and France would rise by 0.35 percent of G.D.P. per year. And the benefits would clearly outweigh the costs. Portugal, for instance, would save 1.9 percent of its G.D.P. in lower interest costs, giving it much-needed breathing room.
Rather than spending so much effort discussing the cost of bailing out Europe, Germany might do better by opening a public debate about the costs of letting the euro start to fall apart. Those are likely to be much less manageable. If the package for Spanish banks was agreed to, Germany would be left directly responsible for more than $100 billion committed since 2010 to the rescues of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The Bundesbank is owed nearly $900 billion by other central banks in the euro area. And its banks still have hundreds of billions in loans to banks in peripheral countries. It’s hard to say what would happen to this debt if the euro were to break apart and weak countries to default. But chances are much of it wouldn’t be honored.
And that’s just the direct financial hit. The German government has reportedly estimated that the German economy would shrink 10 percent if the euro were to break up, twice as much as it did in 2009, during the global financial crisis.
Then, there are the more difficult to measure strategic costs. Already, commentators in Europe are urging France, Spain and Italy to isolate Berlin, offering Germany the kind of ultimatum Germany likes to issue to its poorer neighbors: accept a common European bailout or leave the euro zone.
In light of costs and benefits, it is perplexing why Germany is so adamant in saying no. It hasn’t just blocked pooling bonds. It opposes allowing the European Central Bank to become a lender of last resort for troubled banks. Calls to let German wages rise as fast as German productivity, to allow peripheral countries to close the gap with German labor costs, are derided in Berlin as absurd attempts to curb German competitiveness.
The Harvard economist Jeffrey Frankel, who was on President Bill Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers when the euro came into being more than a decade ago, pointed out that skeptical German voters agreed to trade in the deutsche mark only after their political leaders assured them they would never have to bail anybody out. “It turns out German taxpayers were right and their political leaders were wrong,” Mr. Frankel said.
Chancellor Merkel’s foot-dragging, the impossibly harsh conditions attached to ineffective bailout packages and the German demands to centralize control in Brussels over weak countries’ budgets can be understood as an attempt to persuade German voters that monetary union could be rewritten on German terms. “Merkel will try to extract quid pro quos,” noted Barry Eichengreen, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley. “She will do this by delaying, by asking for prior actions, hoping the other side moves first.”
But given the stakes, it is hard not to conclude that Germany will ultimately pay whatever it takes. It’s not that difficult a call. On one hand, there are manageable costs and clear benefits. On the other, there is a decent chance of unmitigated disaster."

I doubt it.


.